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WHAT THE BEPS?

by
Yariv Brauner*
ABSTRACT

Unprecedented attention to aggressive international tax planning
has shaken the earth under the most powerful players in the world of
international tax policy design. The media exposure of what Bloomberg's
calls "The Great Corporate Tax Dodge," combined with the ever-growing
discontent of civil society with the magnitude of contribution of the largest
multinational enterprises to the society within which they operate, has
recently forced the politicians to take action. Leaders of the strongest world
economies demanded a revision of the rules of the internationaltax regime
that would generate more revenues for their challenged coffers and would
restore public trust in the system. In what is now commonly known as the
Base Erosion and Profit Sharing ("BEPS") project, the OECD has
established three principles: (1) promotion of collaborative rather than
competition based solutions; (2) take a holistic view of the challenges and
their corresponding solutions rather than an ad hoc approach; and (3)
permit the considerationof innovative solutions even when they conflict with
the traditionalpremises of the current internationaltax regime. This Article
reviews the progress of the BEPS project and its compatibility with the
fundamentalprinciplesfor reform set by the OECD with a view to influence
the discourse and the outcome of the project. This Article focuses on the
importance of the paradigm shift from the current emphasis on
competitiveness and the perfection of competition to a collaborative
internationaltax regime, demonstratingthe desirability of such a shift and
suggesting how the OECD should go about making that shift.

* University of Florida Research Foundation Professor, University of
Florida, Levin College of Law. I thank Professor Robert Danon and the participants
in the Swiss "Rethinking Corporate Tax Policy" conference at the University of
Lausanne for their insightful comments. I also thank the Max Planck Institute for
Tax Law and Public Finance, particularly its director Professor Wolfgang Sch6n, for
the kind research support. All mistakes and inaccuracies are mine.
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INTRODUCTION

"What the BEPS are we talking about?" Ask officials from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
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charged with responding to the global outrage over Base Erosion and Profits
Shifting ("BEPS") by mega multinational enterprises ("MNEs").' "It is 'The
Great Corporate Tax Dodge," 2 Bloomberg and other media networks
answer, generating an unprecedented hype over international tax law and
exposing the apparently very successful and allegedly permissible tax
planning techniques of the largest United States MNEs.3 But the OECD
correctly asserts that BEPS is not a new phenomenon, citing President
Kennedy's concerns about much the same phenomenon in 1961.4 Indeed,
there is nothing substantively new about BEPS, yet globalization and the
evolution of the international tax regime have created the conditions for
MNEs to maximize their inherent advantages in tax planning,' and the MNEs
have taken full advantage of these conditions. They perhaps have crossed the
line beyond which these advantages became obviously visible and thus
publicly objectionable.
Thus, the substantive rules of the international tax regime were
beside the point; it was the media exposure of these tax-planning schemes
that mattered. This exposure spilled over beyond the United States to other
countries and, at the same time, triggered political interest in and questioning
1. Pascal Saint-Amans & Raffaele Russo, What the BEPS Are We Talking

About?, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/what-the-beps-are-we-talking-about.htm
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Saint-Amans & Russo, What the Beps?].
2. The Great CorporateTax Dodge, BLOOMBERG, http://topics.bloomberg.
com/the-great-corporate-tax-dodge/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
3. Initially, the tax planning schemes of the largest technology corporations
such as Apple, Microsoft, and Google were exposed. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg &
David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 28,

2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-lowtax-states-and-nations.html? r-0; Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in NoTax Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-1 0/google-revenues-sheltered-in-no-tax-bermuda-soarto-10-billion.html; Richard Waters, Microsoft's Foreign Tax Planning Under Scrutiny,

TIMEs (June 7, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0880cd54-90al-lleO9531-00144feab49a.html#axzz2sl7hvlaz. Soon thereafter, however, it became clear
that the phenomenon is more widespread. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a
FINANCIAL

Latte, Darkly: Starbucks's Stateless Income Planning, 139 TAX NoTES 1515 (June 24,

2013).
4. Saint-Amans & Russo, What the Beps?, supra note 1.

5. These advantages include the obvious opportunities to engage in tax rates
and rules arbitrage and the ability to take advantage of the range of acceptable
transfer prices. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The
Valuation of Intangiblesfor Transfer PricingPurposes, 28 VA. TAX REv. 79, 161-62

(2008) [hereinafter Brauner, Value] (explaining that the transfer pricing rules
produce a range of acceptable prices; such range is available only to MNEs-and
more so to intangible-extensive MNEs-to minimize their effective taxation
unrelated to other tax planning).
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of these practices.6 A perfect storm broke out, exacerbated by the world
economic downturn and the need of revenue that did not skip even the richest
economies. The G20, with some of the discussion supplemented by similar
discourses in other fora,' demanded action and charged the OECD with
finding solutions to BEPS. 8 The OECD-the reluctant caretaker of the
international tax regime-was required to solve the very problems it had
faced for a long time. Now, however, it has a deadline-one that is perhaps
uncomfortably short.9
The first goal of this Article is to evaluate the work done by the
OECD on BEPS to date,o asking: What the BEPS are they doing? This
Article first identifies three distinct, yet interdependable, core principles
established by the BEPS project as fundamental for international tax reform:
(I) the necessity of establishing the international tax regime on a
collaborative-based paradigm rather than a competition-based paradigm; (II)
the importance of taking a systematic or holistic approach to substantive
international tax reform rather than an ad-hoc approach, acknowledging the
interdependence of the norms of the international tax regime; and (III) the
inevitability of accepting completely new solutions to problems that could
not be resolved by the applicable norms, contrary to the traditional
6. See, e.g., Offshore ProfitShifting and the US. Tax Code - Part 2 (Apple
Inc.): Hearing Before the PermanentSubcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & GovernmentalAffairs, 113th Cong. (2013).

7. One such discussion forum was the G8. Prime Minister's Office &
Cabinet Office, G8 factsheet: tax, GOv.UK (June 7, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/g8-factsheet-tax/g8-factsheet-tax.
8. G20, G20 Leaders Declaration,at T48, G20 at Los Cabos, Mexico (June
18-19, 2012), https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g2Oresources/library/G20_
LeadersDeclarationFinal LosCabos.pdf.
9. The tax community should expect finalization of a large set of measures
by early 2014. See Webcast: BEPS Action Plan: Update on 2014 Deliverables,

OECD (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-webcasts.htm [hereinafter
OECD, BEPS Action Plan]. Therefore, the window of opportunity to inform the
discourse is at the present open, but limited.
10. The OECD produced an initial report on February 12, 2013,
"Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting," followed by an action plan that
dictated delivery of a wide set of measures by two primary deadlines, September
2014 and September 2015. There is also a December 2015 deadline for some aspects
of the interest expense action item 4, harmful tax practices (action item 5) and the
multilateral instrument action item 15. See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND
(2013), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Mangement/oecd/
taxation/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#page 1[here
PROFIT SHIFTING

inafter OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING]; OECD, ACTION
PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING].
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conservatism of the international tax regime. This Article then evaluates the
action plan set by the OECD, the various follow-up actions, and the public
and private speeches by OECD officials regarding potential conclusions of
the BEPS project in light of the abovementioned principles. The goal of this
evaluation, even if partly based on educated speculation regarding future
action, is to influence the outcome of the project while the window of
opportunity to do so is still open. This Article views the fundamental
principles of the BEPS project as desirable and instructive and it critically
exposes the instances in which it identifies that the OECD may deviate from
those principles.
The second goal of this Article is to expose, through the analysis of
the BEPS project, the failings of the current competition-based paradigm of
the international tax regime and to demonstrate the desirability of a shift of
paradigm towards a more collaborative regime based on cooperation and
coordination of tax policies. BEPS and the corporate tax planning schemes
that have enraged the ailing world economies are a direct result of this
current international tax regime" that is characterized first and foremost by
competition for investment and revenue among countries. Ricardian trade
theory led the world powers in the beginning of the last century to agree on
some regulation of this competition. Standardization and reciprocity were
thought to enhance competition and thus to improve efficiency and growth
potential. As a result, standard setting has been acceptable, especially when
led by the rich countries' club-the OECD. Yet the primary building block
of the regime has always been domestic law, unilaterally enacted and
implemented, even if subject to limitations imposed by the rather weak
norms of the international tax regime woven together by bilateral tax treaties.
The BEPS project's most fundamental insight to date has been
noting the failure of this paradigm. Countries, even those with the strongest
economies, are not powerful enough to satisfactorily enforce their tax laws
pursuant to the current regime. By definition, unilateral action, regardless of
its substance, cannot succeed, and consequently, international coordination
of tax policies is required as a condition for any chance to implement
substantial reform. Implementing this insight into an international tax reform
would be an immense achievement. The OECD has already jumpstarted the
process and now has an opportunity to make progress toward this goal. This
11. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REv. 167, 169

(1999) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Commentary] (explaining that the regime is
constructed around the network of bilateral tax treaties, essentially all of which are
modeled after the OECD Model Tax Convention). The original acknowledgment of
the existence of such a regime was in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah's "The Structure of
International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Structure of InternationalTaxation: A Proposalfor Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv.
1301 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, A Proposalfor Simplification].
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Article wishes to support the OECD so that it does not get distracted and
resort to the old habits specifically identified as ineffective by the BEPS
project.
The BEPS project is not merely a populist sensation. Some may try
to diminish its importance, arguing that the media exposure and the political
interest are likely to disappear when the next story emerges. Others may
argue that BEPS is not significant enough to cause concern and, in any event,
may not be all that harmful. Alternatively, they may argue that governments
who support "their" firms competing on the market soberly permit BEPS.
Such governments have the ability and sufficient information to change
course, yet they choose not to do so in the name of so-called international
competitiveness. Contrary to this line of argumentation, this Article argues
that the BEPS project is important and requires tax technical and policy
attention. It reasons that while the political demand of action does not go
away, it is obviously more desirable to advance the international tax regime
rather than harm it. The OECD must do "something;" it is the responsibility
of the international tax community to make an effort and to ensure that the
outcome is positive. The tight timeline is particularly worrisome in that
regard. A key tactical concern is that the haste would trigger popular, ad-hoc
partial solutions based on an already existing arsenal of measures rather than
comprehensive and principled rethinking of the yet-to-be-beaten challenges.
That would be per se undesirable and a waste of the political will to reform
the international tax regime, when such political will is usually an obstacle
for progress in the field.
The BEPS project is also important because reform is substantively
necessary. The alleged modest magnitude of BEPS, especially when
observed in light of the relatively small amount of revenue involved and the
alternative tax planning techniques otherwise available to MNEs, supported a
cynical view of the project. Nonetheless, although the empirical research of
BEPS is not as extensive and comprehensive as one would expect, and the
relevant data available clearly leaves something to be desired, they are
significant enough to trigger action.12 One should add to the benefits of
action the opportunity to improve not only the more-limited BEPS-negating
consequences, but also the international tax regime in general.
The third goal of this Article is to insert into the discourse an element
that is often missing, yet is at its core: the legitimacy and stability of the
international tax regime. This should not be ignored in these times of crisis
and of opportunity. Cooperation among countries on BEPS-negating
measures may, and should, serve as an example for cooperation and
12. See, e.g., Clemens Fuest, Christoph Spengel, Katharina Finke, Jost H.
Heckemeyer & Hannah Nusser, Profit Shifting and "Aggressive" Tax Planning by
MultinationalFirms: Issues and Optionsfor Reform, 5 WORLD TAX J. 307, 314-16
(2013) (reviewing literature and assessments of the question).
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coordination of tax policies more generally. Involvement of civil society and
general transparency could go a long way toward progress. It also should
have the benefit of support from governments confronted by political
pressure from business. In this regard, it would be a mistake to limit the
importance of the BEPS project to the "OECD world." All productive
countries suffer the consequences of BEPS, and, consequently, all the lessproductive countries may find themselves as the targets of at least some of
the proposed measures to combat BEPS.
Part II of this Article provides an exposition of the competitionbased character of the current international tax regime and its consequential
failings and the opportunities presented by policy coordination. Part III
follows with an analysis of the OECD's action plan and evaluates the plan in
light of the fundamental principles for reform set by the project. Part IV
concludes with a normative assessment of the BEPS project as an
opportunity for an unprecedented international tax reform that would give
the ailing international tax regime the chance for recovery to the benefit of
all.
II.

OUR COMPETITION-BASED INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME

To understand the insight of the BEPS project regarding the
inevitability of collaboration among countries on tax matters, one must first
understand the current international tax regime that has, on principle, been
resisting cooperation and coordination of tax policies. This Part begins with
an explanation of current policies; it then proceeds to explore the challenges
that these competition-based policies have faced; and finally, it explains what
cooperation means in this context and how countries may go about reforming
the international tax regime to accommodate a cooperative approach.
A.

The Rise of the InternationalTax Regime

The current international tax regime is constructed from a large
network of (mostly) bilateral tax treaties-some 3000 of them.13 These
treaties regulate the tax consequences of a very large portion of world trade
and investment, often estimated at 85 percent. The overwhelming majority of
these treaties conform to a single model convention that has evolved over the
years to the current 2010 OECD model.14 It is estimated further that about 75
13. See Avi-Yonah, Commentary, supra note 11; Avi-Yonah, A Proposal
for Simpification, supra note 11; REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS

OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 2-4

(2007) [hereinafter AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW].

14. The 2010 OECD model has evolved over the years from the initial 1963
OECD draft model. The latter continued the tax treaty project originally initiated by
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percent of the language of all bilateral tax treaties is identical to the language
of the OECD model.' 5 Yet, even beyond that, the OECD has clearly been
successful in standardizing the international tax discourse and dominating its
evolution in the last half-century. Tax treaties and domestic tax laws have
clearly converged, often in the direction of conformity with the norms
promoted by the OECD. International tax professionals all speak the same
"language," and essentially all divergences from the standard norms are
expected and familiar to those educated in the field.
Divergences, of course, do exist. The international tax regime has
not yet evolved into a supranational norm although some have suggested that
it is close-perhaps at the verge of being considered customary international
law.' 6 This suggestion, however, is probably outside the consensus.
Nonetheless, until recently it was clear that the strong trend was of rule
convergence and of increasing power accumulation by the OECD as the
caretaker of the international tax regime. The OECD has shown ambivalence
about its caretaker role, however. On one hand the OECD has worked on
increasing its power and influence worldwide, primarily through the
promotion of standardization and convergence; yet, on the other hand it
always has been and has viewed itself as the representative of the interests of
its members-the club of the rich countries. As such, it perhaps viewed itself
unauthorized to consider interests of other countries, at least to the extent
they conflict with its members' interests. At the same time, no other
institution came close to being a candidate for leading-or even hosting-a
global international tax discourse." Consequently, the current international
the League of Nations in the 1920s. See, e.g., PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTIONS intro. § A (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2013) (providing a brief review of
the history of the OECD model).
15. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction

(Dec. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract-1048441.
16. AvI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
13, at 3-5.
17. The United Nations abandoned its tax project after WWII, and has only
recently resumed the work in the area, yet even then in a limited capacity and
explicitly not in competition with the OECD. This recent work is demonstrated on
the website of the new section for international cooperation in tax matters within the
U.N.'s Financing for Development division. See, e.g., Committee of Experts on
InternationalCooperation in Tax Matters, FINANCING FOR DEv., http://www.un.org/

esa/ffd/tax/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). Another proposed candidate was the WTO.
See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal
With Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV. 533 (2002). But see, e.g., Yariv Brauner,
An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259 (2003)

[hereinafter Brauner, Crystallization](dismissing the WTO's capability of serving as
the caretaker of the international tax regime due to its lack of tradition and expertise
on tax matters, and due to its already existing political difficulties of managing its
traditional international regulatory fields, such as investment, IP,agriculture, etc.).
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tax regime has crystallized in an evolutionary manner, with no clear forum or
global leadership. Naturally, the interests of the stronger economies have
dominated the regime. The typical manifestation of this increasing
dominance was the trend toward more residence-based taxation at the
expense of source taxation, as promoted by the OECD.
B.

The Fall of the InternationalTax Regime?

This picture of global dominance over the international tax rules by
the OECD and its rich members has altered in recent years. Globalization
and the now well-known changes in the power map around the world
dictated this change. The strongest OECD economies, including Germany,
the U.K., France, Japan, and, most of all, the former superpower-the United
States-have lost significant clout. Former struggling economies, such as the
BRICS countries, have emerged and learned that they are able to leverage
their new power. At the same time, MNEs have gained power at the expense
of nation-states-primarily at the expense of their own rich countries of
residence. These developments shook the international tax regime, leading
some to suspect its demise." Such demise manifested itself primarily in two
developments.
First, the emerging economies-particularly China, India, and
Brazil-have taken a more active role in the shaping of the international tax
regime, despite not being OECD members.' 9 This has resulted in a reversal
of the trend towards maximizing residence taxation mentioned above. Recent
years have been marked by the OECD's attempts to increasingly permit
source taxation. 2 0 There is some controversy over the exact drivers,

18. See, e.g., Philip Baker, Is There a Cure for BEPS?, 5 BRJT. TAX REV.
605, 606 (2013) (arguing that the OECD's continuing dominance over the
international tax regime seriously depends on its success of delivering meaningful
reform, by consensus, through the BEPS project).
19. China and India have done this primarily through vocal participation as
observers in OECD proceedings, and Brazil through an adoption of a norm decidedly
different and often explicitly rejected by the OECD. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner &
Pasquale Pistone, Eds., BRICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME (IBFD,
forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Brauner & Pistone, BRICS] (exposing the opposition
presented by the BRICS countries to the OECD and its model tax convention and
assessing the future of the international tax regime in light of the decrease of power
among OECD members and increase of power of non-OECD member countries).
20. The most notable example for this trend is the acceptance by the OECD
of the notion of service PE, permitting taxation by the source country of income
related to mere service provision even in the absence of a "permanent establishment"
in the traditional sense. See, e.g., OECD, Commentary on the Model Tax Convention
art. 5, 1 4 (2010) [hereinafter OECD, Commentary].
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motivations, and magnitude of this reversal of trend, yet there should be little
debate about its direction and the importance of the actions by the
abovementioned countries to effectuate it. Naturally, such a change in course
reduced the level of convergence and standardization within the international
tax regime.
Second, nation-states as a whole-and the richest nations in
particular-have lost power and simultaneously to the rise of their own
MNEs, some of which have gained power and riches beyond those of many
countries. 2 1 Globalization significantly increased the mobility and potential
profitability of MNEs, and thus reduced much of their dependence on their
countries of residence. The legal framework and the lack of coordination
among countries further permitted these MNEs-as explained below-to
also avoid some of the regulatory power imposed by countries, including
their taxpaying obligations. The international tax regime has proven
incapable of stopping them, as asserted by the BEPS project.
Consequently, countries in general face a revenue crisis. Developed
countries, although still the most powerful countries, suffer most of all in
relative terms because they have been hit hardest by the global financial
crisis; they have the most to lose from the shift of global economic power;
they are expected more than most to finance expensive programs
(particularly the welfare state); and, being democratic, they are the most
politically fragile and the least nimble. Emerging economies suffer lessperhaps because they are growing-yet they too are losing power to MNEs,
and they too have begun to deal with civil society pressure of the kind
reserved for the developed countries that they are becoming. Finally, the
developing world unquestionably suffers because it did not have a voice in
the first place, and it is unlikely that it will have any say at all when at odds
with MNEs that are politically and financially more powerful. This general
threat on countries of all kinds serves as a common ground to incentivize
intemational action on corporate taxation in general and BEPS in particular.
Unfortunately, such collective action is contrary to the current properties of
the international tax regime, as explained next by this Article.
C.

Tax Competition

The international tax regime is-and has always been-first and
foremost about competition. Countries view themselves as competitors for
investment and revenue. Collaborative action among countries is limited to

21. See, e.g., Companies Richer than Countries in UN List, THE SCOTSMAN
(Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.scotsman.com/business/economy/companies-richerthan-countries-in-un-list-1-616810 (reporting on data and discussion of this
phenomenon in the 2002 World Summit in South Africa).
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perfecting competition, accomplished through the removal of market failures
and facilitation of free trade.22 These were the motivations for the
construction of the international tax regime and for its evolution over the
years. The original regime was designed for immobile income production by
brick-and-mortar economies. Thus, it is based on the residence and source
paradigm. All countries essentially tax their residents-their people that
cannot go elsewhere-on a residence base and tax foreigners with physical
presence within the countries' territory on such physical presence, hence
source base. The increasing mobility of labor and capital, coupled with the
ascent of intangible assets, left this paradigm unfitting. As demonstrated by
Avi-Yonah, neither the developed nor the developing countries are now able
to collect much revenue based on this paradigm.23
Yet, this paradigm continues to dominate the international tax regime
because of the inability of countries to cooperate and coordinate their
policies. Residence countries assert their power to increase residence
taxation that they still believe they can collect at the expense of source
taxation. Source jurisdictions resort to tax concessions; they understand that
they have lost the ability to tax, so they attempt to make sure that at least
they can preserve investment in their country, hoping, usually unwisely, to
benefit from its other positive spillover even if it does not directly generate
revenue at the short-term.24 The newly strong source jurisdictions, such as
India, attempt also to reverse the trend and collect some source taxation at
the expense of the residence countries.25
Thus, despite the impressive convergence of norms and
standardization manifested in the international tax regime, it is a competitive,
beggar-thy-neighbor approach that has been guiding the norms themselves.

22. See, e.g., Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on
International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001) [hereinafter Roin,
Competition and Evasion] (arguing that harmonization efforts, like all cartelization
attempts, are bound to fail and advocating constructive, rather than destructive,
competition). For a recent review of the economic literature on the subject, see
Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, The Theory of International Tax Competition and
Coordination (Max Planck Inst. for Tax Law and Pub. Fin., Working Paper No.
2012-06, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract=2111895.
23. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, The Future of Tax Incentives, in TAX LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 25 (Brauner & Stewart eds., 2013) (explaining that tax incentives tell
a story of tax competition that compels source jurisdiction to grant such incentives
although they understand that they are not effective growth triggers).
25. For a review of these developments see, for example, D.P. Sengupta,
India Chapter, in Brauner & Pistone, BRICS, supra note 19.
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Competition and Coordination

The tax competition debate has often been framed as a competition
versus harmonization contest. Supporters of tax competition are primarily
responsible for this framing and the frequent all-or-nothing analysis that
typically leads to preference for more tax competition.26 Discomfort about a
global tax government and disbelief in the ability of countries to agree on all
matters important for international taxation led to immediate dismissal of any
alternative to the tax competition paradigm without a serious study and
consideration of its benefits.
Failures of the competition paradigm have not discouraged its
proponents, as they have continued to advocate further perfection of the
competition again and again with little success.27 The undesirable aspects of
tax competition are merely tagged as "harmful tax competition" and rogue
players-tax havens-were handled by invitation to subscribe to the rules of
the (competition) game, 28 or to abide by a "code of conduct," 29 rather than by
exclusion. All such action has clearly failed to date.30
This Article demonstrates that there is a risk that the BEPS project
will follow the same path and methods and will therefore likely fail if it does
not adopt a new approach. To do that, the OECD should acknowledge that
collective action of some sort is necessary, and the only aspect in question is
the extent of coordination desirable rather than a clear choice between
cooperation and competition.
Current rules are largely characterized by a similar binary choice-a
preference for source or residence taxation. Only one country between the
two involved "wins."
In general, sharing or apportionment is not
acceptable. The one occasion where the rules divert from this paradigm is in
the conventional tax treaty limitations on source countries' withholding tax
26. See, e.g., Roin, Competitionand Evasion, supra note 22.

27. Demonstrated best by OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
10.
28. See, e.g., OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL

SHIFTING, supra note

ISSUE (1998), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf.
29. See Harmful Tax Competition, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/taxation/companytax/harmfultaxpractices/

(last visited Mar. 29, 2014).

30. The OECD has even discontinued the maintenance of its Harmful Tax
Competition website. For a more optimistic view of the campaign, yet one that
includes a fair, and not so favorable, evaluation of it, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, 34
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 783 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 194942 [hereinafter AviYonah, Harmful Tax Competition Report].
31. See, e.g., articles 7, 8, and 13 of most tax treaties, following the
corresponding articles of the 2010 OECD Model.
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rates on dividends, interest, and royalties. 32 These rules permit source
taxation, yet they do not grant a total taxing power to the source countries as
they do in all other cases; rather, they limit the source countries' taxing
power to an acceptable portion, leaving the rest to the residence country.
This sole deviation from the all-or-nothing norm is, however, rather limited
and is being constantly decimated. First, the clear trend led by the OECD has
been to eliminate withholding taxes. The OECD has effectively eliminated
the source countries' portion of taxing interest and royalties, leaving only
dividends subject to this unique construct. Yet many OECD countries push
further in the direction of reducing withholding taxes to zero-even on
dividends.34 Many other countries do not tax dividends at source, and others
exempt them at residence.3 s These trends leave a pretty limited role for this
exception to the clear binary nature of the norms of the international tax
regime in the general scheme of this regime; the design of the rules
demonstrates the competition paradigm that is at its heart. This paradigm has
led to the current deficit in the ability of countries to collect taxes. This
Article argues that this deficit is not unavoidable. The solution is in
cooperation among countries to make sure that they all enjoy at least somepreferably fair-revenue raising potential. This will be possible if
apportionment and sharing that have been avoided in the past are embraced
by the international tax regime.
E.

Coordination

Cooperation and coordination of tax policies do not require
complete, or even partial, harmonization of the international tax rules,
although the latter may be-unrelatedly---desirable.3 6 They simply permit
allocation of taxing rights in a manner that is different from that of the
current all-or-nothing rules. Take, for example, a simple yet common
scenario: A customer in country A calls for paid computer support in country
B. Both A and B have here a reasonable taxing claim. Current rules call for a
decision to be made: Where is the source of the service income at question?
32. E.g., articles 10-12 of tax treaties, following the 2010 OECD Model.
33. Id.
34. Led by the United States. See, e.g., Linda L. Ng, World Tax Advisor:
Japan-US Treaty Protocol Sets New Gold Standard, DELOITrE (Feb. 22, 2013),

http://newsletters.usdbriefs.com/2013/Tax/WTA/130222_1 .html (describing the
adoption of this rule in the most recent treaty renegotiation by the United States).
35. See, e.g., Carlo Garbarino, Taxation of EU Cross-Border Corporate
Dividends: Convergence and Tax Competition (Bocconi Legal Studies, Research

Paper No. 2298085, 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract=2298085 (a recent review of
these developments in EU countries).
36. See, e.g., Brauner, Crystallization,supra note 17 (advocating a gradual

and partial harmonization of the international tax rules).

FloridaTax Review

68

[Vol. 16:2

In the brick-and-mortar economy this was generally an easy question that
everybody answered quite similarly. Yet, in the above scenario, country A
uses an analogy to low-tech services and views the source as the place where
the service provider is located, that is, country A, whereas country B may
view it based on an economic analysis in country B. There is no right or
wrong here, no economically or morally correct answer. In fact, source has
never been about moral or economic correctness, but rather about legitimacy
and practicality: it was viewed as fair and hence acceptable that the source
country gets to tax income generated by an effort made within its
jurisdiction. Legitimacy and acceptance may be preserved if both source and
residence countries viewed a solution as fair. Logic requires here a split of
the tax base between the competing jurisdictions; it does not matter what
split-fifty-fifty or otherwise-because it is the principle that is being
debated.
The problem with a split is that it would be difficult to gather
sufficient support for a split norm that would not be based on some pseudoeconomical or otherwise justification unless an admittedly unreasonable and
unlikely Solomonian fifty-fifty default rule is administered. But, we already
said that such justifications do not really exist. Consequently, a split could
only be reached by agreement rather than by an external rule. A default
external rule may make reaching an agreement simpler, though. Moreover,
circumstances change, so such an agreement must be crafted in a
sophisticated way to give it a dynamic ability to adapt to changes in
circumstances. The above simple example could in fact be resolved in a
simple manner of fifty-fifty or otherwise, yet more-complex situations
require more-complex solutions, and necessarily more-complex agreements.
These agreements may be based on economic indicators, such as the effort
involved, capital spent, etc. Yet, they cannot follow a singular "truth" that
simply does not exist. One can easily detect that the above analysis
demonstrates the need for a shift from the current source and residence
paradigm to a regime that is based on more formulary elements if the
international tax regime is to survive. Although this Article reverts to this
observation in the conclusion, next it analyzes the OECD BEPS project in
light of the project's insights explained above and the understanding
established here that competition and unilateral action have led to the current
crisis and that only coordination could resolve it.
III.

THE OECD ACTION PLAN

This Part analyzes the OECD's BEPS action plan, together with the
actions and statements by OECD and other country officials pertaining to the
plan, for its compatibility with the fundamental principles of the BEPS
project. More specifically, this Part evaluates to what extent do the above
actions and statements reflect a change of paradigm toward a more

What the BEPS?

2014]

69

collaborative international tax regime of the sort explained in Part II. It
further assesses whether these actions and statements truly reflect a holistic
approach to international tax reform and openness to including innovative
mechanisms in such reform.
The action plan itself is by now well known. It includes 15 action
items with deadlines for deliverables on September 15, 2014 or 2015, with a
few residual issues scheduled for December 2015." The action items are a
potpourri of issues and reflect the opportunistic and unprincipled upbringing
of the BEPS project. Nonetheless, one could identify five topical groups of
action items. First, there are the more-general, overarching action items that
represent some ongoing challenges to the international tax regime. This
group includes action items one ("Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital
Economy") and five ("Counter Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively,
Taking into Account Transparency and Substance"). A second group
includes the perhaps "true" action items: substantive norms, which had their
vulnerability exposed by BEPS and which require technical revision to
address these challenges. These are action items two ("Neutralise the Effects
of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements"), three ("Strengthen CFC Rules"), four
("Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deductions and Other Financial
Payments"), six ("Prevent Treaty Abuse"), and seven ("Prevent the Artificial
Avoidance of PE Status"). This group should include the transfer pricing
regime as well, yet due to that regime's centrality to both the threat presented
by BEPS and to the BEPS project itself, this Part discusses it separately in a
third group that includes action items eight through 10 ("Assure that Transfer
Pricing Outcomes Are in Line with Value Creation") and 13 ("Re-examine
Transfer Pricing Documentation"). A fourth group includes the supporting
cast, a set of action items dealing with administrative and compliance issues.
These are action items 11 ("Establish Methodologies to Collect and Analyse
Data on BEPS and the Actions to Address It"), 12 ("Require Taxpayers to
Disclose Their Aggressive Tax Planning Arrangements"), and 14 ("Make
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective"). Finally, this Part
separately discusses action item 15-which explores the possibility of
developing a multilateral instrument-because it is the direct manifestation
of the key insight of the BEPS project: promoting the necessity of a
universal, collaborative international tax regime.
A.

The General Challenges

The general, overarching challenges addressed by the action plan
represent two different aspects of the effect of globalization on the
international tax regime.
37. See OECD,
supra note 10.

ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING,
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Action Item 1 ("Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital
Economy")

The current international tax rules were not designed for the new
digital economy. They attempted to adapt to technological progress and the
ascent in importance of value created by intangibles, especially in the crossborder context. Yet, they were merely tweaked 39 -apparently
unsatisfactorily-to fit these changes. 4 0 Therefore, the need arose to:
Identify the main difficulties that the digital
economy poses for the application of existing international
tax rules and develop detailed options to address these
difficulties, taking a holistic approach and considering both
direct and indirect taxation. Issues to be examined include,
but are not limited to, the ability of a company to have a
significant digital presence in the economy of another
country without being liable to taxation due to the lack of
nexus under current international rules, the attribution of
value created from the generation of marketable locationrelevant data through the use of digital products and
services, the characterisation of income derived from new
business models, the application of related source rules, and
how to ensure the effective collection of VAT/GST with
respect to the cross-border supply of digital goods and

38. See, e.g., Chang Hee Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax
Revenue Between Developed and Developing Countries, 4 J. OF KOREAN L. 19, 21

(2004) ("[D]igital technology completely destroys the economic and legal basis for
the existing rules of international taxation, implying the necessity of a complete
overhaul . . . .").

39. See, e.g., OECD,
BUSINESS

ARE THE CURRENT TREATY RULES FOR TAXING
PROFITS APPROPRIATE FOR E-COMMERCE?, FINAL REPORT (2004),

http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/3586903 2.pdf [hereinafter
OECD,
TAXING
BUSINESS PROFITS]; OECD, E-COMMERCE: TRANSFER PRICING AND BUSINESS
PROFITS TAXATION, TAX POLICY STUDIES No. 10 (2005), http://www.biac.org/
members/tax/BEPS/ECommerceTransfer Pricingand BusinessProfits Taxation.pdf.
The
most
significant outcome of this work was the changes to Article 5 in the OECD
Commentary, resulting in the addition of paragraphs 42.1-42.10.

40. This is evidenced by the OECD's identifying the "[a]pplication of treaty
concepts to profits derived from the delivery of digital goods and services" as a key
pressure area that must be addressed by the BEPS project, later reflected in action
item 1. See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note
10, at 47.
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services. Such work will require a thorough analysis of the
various business models in this sector.4'
Indeed, BEPS is first and foremost about globalization and MNEs.
As a business model, MNEs can only be justified by significant intangible
content,42 which is naturally augmented by the ascent of the digital economy
and its contribution to globalization. Therefore, it is natural for the BEPS
project to focus on the advantages that the digital economy provides to
MNEs. However, not just a macro view justifies focus on the digital
economy and transactions in intangibles; such a focus is also dictated by the
immediate triggering of the public interest in BEPS and the tax planning
schemes of the largest MNEs-such as Apple, Microsoft, and Google-all of
which have business models heavily relying on intangibles.43
The challenge of this "new economy" is not new, of course. The
OECD-together with essentially all countries-struggled with it in the near
past. The OECD was rather successful in reaching some sort of a consensus
on the most critical issues-mainly those concerning PEs-at a time when
most countries had remained helpless and unable to act unilaterally."
Nonetheless, such success provided only a Band-Aid for a more serious hurt.
BEPS has proven that the most critical conclusion of the OECD at that time
cannot be sustained in the long run:
As regards the various alternatives for fundamental changes
... the TAG concluded that it would not be appropriate to

embark on such changes at this time. Indeed, at this stage, ecommerce and other business models resulting from new
communication technologies would not, by themselves,
justify a dramatic departure from the current rules. Contrary
to early predictions, there does not seem to be actual
evidence that the communications efficiencies of the internet
have caused any significant decrease to the tax revenues of
capital importing countries.45
The BEPS project acknowledged that even if the above was correct
in 1999, it isn't so at the present. It is easy to see how the fundamental
41. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 1, at 14.
42. RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 162-88 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the advantage of MNEs as hierarchies
under the transaction cost model vis-a-vis contractors on the market).
43. See, e.g., supra notes 2-3.

44. Primarily with the adoption of the new, specific commentary on Article
5.
45. OECD,

TAxING

BUSINESS

PROFITS,

supra note 39, T350, at 72.
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principles of BEPS come into play in the context of this action item. First,
the third principle is stated clearly here-continuing to tweak the old rules is
not acceptable; the new economy requires new, innovative solutions. The
action item also explicitly mentions the second principle of BEPS-the need
for a holistic approach, including an interesting mention of the desirability of
coordinating income and consumption taxation. Finally, the first principle of
BEPS becomes obviously relevant when the technical challenges presented
by the digital economy are analyzed. It is apparent that in this context
unilateral action did not work in the past and cannot work in the present,
necessitating a more serious attempt at international cooperation.
What then are these technical challenges? The 1990s work focused
on permanent establishment ("PE") issues-primarily on the question of
whether a PE can be triggered without people on the ground-and the scope
is now significantly expanded by the BEPS project. Action item one begins
its description of issues with the same PE issue, yet it uses a more general
language of "nexus" and taxable presence, not limiting itself to the PE
questions of past. Further, it mentions the difficulty of attributing profits to
potentially taxable presence of the digital kind. This language may imply that
the OECD wishes to reform and regulate the entire taxing regime applicable
to cross-border digital business income. This wish is consistent with a will
for a more comprehensive reform. However, the action item specifically
mentions attribution of profits related to the controversial marketing
intangibles, which is a rather marginal issue promoted by the United States
with little enthusiasm among other countries and the OECD.46 Next, the
action item mentions the important interaction and similar problems faced by
non-income taxes. Finally, the action item specifically mentions the inherent
difficulty of classifying and sourcing income from intangibles andindirectly-also the difficulty of valuing various intangibles.
The articulation and order of issues are puzzling. It looks like an
almost accidental mix of general issues-mostly important but inconsistently
organized-as if it were just a few examples thrown in about the challenges
presented by the digital economy. Yet, a second glance reveals that this is a
list of issues that the OECD has already been working on, and for these
issues it can present some results. Necessarily, the list includes articulation of
specific doctrinal spheres rather than a discussion of conceptual issues. This
is disconcerting. It clearly demonstrates that the OECD is treading in the
familiar territories of traditional and limited doctrinal analysis. Such an
analysis is unlikely to be holistic or open to innovation, and it is definitely
unlikely to lead to a change in paradigm.

46. The Glaxo dispute is a good example for the potential conflicts over
marketing intangibles. See, e.g., Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, U.S. Settle Transfer Pricing
Dispute, 43 TAX NOTES INT'L 956 (Sept. 18, 2006).
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This concern is exacerbated by the choice of the OECD--explained
perhaps by the tight time frame-to aspire only to a report about the
challenges presented by the digital economy rather than request analysis and
solutions.4 7 Further, the report is requested from a special task force created
from government officials by the OECD, yet not within the OECD where
true action is expected.4 8
The issues that the BEPS project must address include, first, a clear
acknowledgement that intangibles and e-commerce are different and
therefore require fitting treatment rather than application of old doctrine by
analogy. This means, for example, that physical presence simply cannot be
the only trigger of tax jurisdiction-as it is essentially now. This is the
principle that needs to be reduced to operating rules. A traditional approach
would be to adjust the PE rules to this principle. This may be possible, but
would require a much more sophisticated approach to the PE rules. The
problem is that there is significant resistance to a fundamental revision of the
PE rules. The United States is leading this opposition to progreSS49-perhaps
believing that it would primarily affect United States MNEs-yet ignoring
the fact that it is the conduct of these MNEs that triggered BEPS in the first
place. In fact, the United States opposes the inclusion of action item one in
the BEPS project, which signals that it opposes the project's developing into
a major overhaul of the international tax regime. The United States perhaps
wishes to view action item one as a device for countering the most egregious
abusive behavior,o very much in line of traditional OECD action and in stark

47. See the explanation of OECD official Mr. Raffaele Russo, OECD,
BEPS Action Plan,supra note 9.
4 8. Id.
49. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, The Digital Economy and Permanent
Establishment, 70 TAx NOTES INT'L 297 (April 22, 2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, The
Digital Economy]; Lee A. Sheppard & Jaime Arora, ABA Meeting: Multinationals
Must Accept BEPS Project, U.S. Official Says, 70 TAx NOTES INT'L 727 (May 20,
2013) [hereinafter Sheppard & Arora, ABA Meeting] (quoting Robert Stack, the
United States Treasury deputy assistant secretary (international tax affairs), stating,
inter alia: "Digital income is not something that needs to be separately broken
out.").
50. See, e.g., Sheppard & Arora, ABA Meeting, supra note 49; Kristen
Parillo, Days of Double Non-Taxation Are Over, US. Treasury official Says, 139
TAX NOTES 1217 (June 10, 2013) (quoting, again, Mr. Stack, the United States
Treasury deputy assistant secretary (international tax affairs), stating: "[Firom the
U.S. standpoint, the BEPS project is about addressing the stripping of income from
higher-tax jurisdictions into low- or no-tax jurisdictions. That's a really important
point because it's not a project that is about a fundamental reexamination of
residence and source country taxation.

and another time.").

. .

. That debate can happen at another place
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contrast to the fundamental principles of the BEPS project as exposed by this
Article.
This Article suggests that another approach-more transparent and
more consistent with the three principles of BEPS-would be to seek a
formulary taxing scheme for "digital" business income.5 ' This would require
collaboration among jurisdictions so that they can agree on the parameters
included in such formulary taxation; yet, as already explained, developing
mechanisms for such collaboration is the primary task of the BEPS project
and the necessary consequence of its key insight about the inevitability of
cooperation. This type of solution also would be consistent with the third
principle of BEPS because it requires innovation-formulary taxation-that
has been rejected by the OECD to date.
A second fundamental issue that this action item must address relates
to the valuation of intangibles-the acknowledged difficulty of which is the
source of many of the relevant issues. The action item does not mention it
because it has been relegated to the transfer-pricing portion of the action
plan.52 Unexplored is the unique power of network effects on intangibles and
their interconnected value that is often difficult to bifurcate and separate into
defined, separate items-as required by the current tax rules. Again, a more
sophisticated approach is required here, perhaps in deviation from the
orthodoxy and beyond the language of the action item. A related
fundamental issue of the source of digital income is simply ignored. It
should, of course, come up in the task force's work, but it demonstrates the
insufficiency of the language of this action item. Another example is the
mention of marketing intangibles that are controversial but do not represent a
key element in BEPS. In the context of source there are some fundamental
issues that must be addressed, although their comprehensive analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article. First is the issue of services. This has been a
major bone of controversy between developing countries and the OECD, and
has led to extensive work within the OECD and even the U.N. Much of the
digital economy involves services and income that is definedcontroversially at times-as income from services. An exposition of the
digital economy cannot be complete without a serious treatment of this issue.
A second issue-distinct, yet similar in principle-is the treatment of
51. For an example of a proposal to adopt formulary taxation of business
profits more generally, see, for example, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly
Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy: A Proposal to
Adopt Formulary Apportionment, in PATH TO PROSPERITY: HAMILTON PROJECT
IDEAS ON INCOME SECURITY, EDUCATION AND TAXES 319-44 (Furman & Bordorff

eds., 2008).
52. And therefore the Article discusses its details below as well.

53. See the U.N. dedicated website, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/docu
ments/bgrdmodel tts.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
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information, or data, which has grown to be a major factor in the creation of
value by the digital economy. A recent report by French officials raised
much controversy, concluding that such data provided by consumers requires
shift of significant taxing rights to such consumers' residence countrieswhich are normally viewed as source countries by the traditional analysis. 5 4
The test for the OECD would be to tackle these conceptual
challenges that are truly presented by the digital economy, avoiding the
ubiquitous resort to the "difficult cases are difficult" rhetoric. Similarly, it
should ignore the notation in the action plan that "a different distribution of
taxing rights which may lead to low taxation is not per se an indicator of
defects in the existing system."" This statement may be interpreted as a mild
statement to relieve concern among MNEs about the OECD targeting their
tax planning "rights." But in the context of BEPS, one should be concerned
that a fundamental point would be overlooked-that despite the difficulty of
determining where value is created, it is not difficult to understand where it
is not created. Value is not created where significant R&D does not take
place; it is not created where flesh and blood are not present to take all the
important decisions about the exploitation of the intangibles, regardless of
the distinction between strategic and day-to-day decisions; and it is not
created where it is not significantly exploited for the betterment of a large
number of human beings. This means that value cannot be determined to be
significantly created in places where tax rates are uniquely low.
In conclusion, action item one raises some concern about the
potential consistency of the relevant project's action with the fundamental
principles of BEPS, yet many of the issues that may and should be
immediately addressed are included in action items of the second group,
discussed below-including primarily PE issues, hybrid mismatch
arrangements, and transfer pricing. One hopes that the task force charged
with this non-action item will indeed deal with the conceptual issues
presented above consistently with the fundamental principles of BEPS as
explained by this Part.

54. Nicolas Colin, Corporate Tax 2.0: Why France and the World Need a
New Tax System for the Digital Age, FORBEs (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/singularity/2013/01/28/corporate-tax-2-0-why-france-and-the-world-needa-new-tax-system-for-the-digital-age/ (review of the report by one of its coauthors);
see also Sheppard, The Digital Economy, supra note 49.
55. OECD, BEPS Action Plan, supra note 9, at 10.
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Action Item 5 ("Counter Harmful Tax Practices More
Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and
Substance")

Similar to action item one, this is a general, overarching item; its
somewhat vague language necessarily covers issues that are specifically
included in other action items. Yet there is history here and-not unlike a
few other BEPS project items-it is a history of failure. This action item
should therefore be read in context-narrower than what its language
implies-as an attempt to resuscitate the OECD's harmful tax competition
campaign.56
As such, this action item is about tax havens, non-haven offshore
regimes, and similar rent-seeking and other beggar-thy-neighbor regimes in
traditionally high-tax jurisdictions. These regimes are the rougher tools of the
trade of players involved in current tax competition. In the harmful tax
competition campaign, the OECD has used a carrot-and-stick approach,
based on its traditional competition-based paradigm, to convince all of the
above regimes to adopt some transparency measures-mainly in the form of
enhanced information exchange. The idea was that transparency is the cureall, most appropriate mechanism to smooth the rough edges-consequently
perfecting international tax competition. Again, the competition paradigm
continuously failed. Regardless, change of paradigm to enhanced
coordination was not considered.
The BEPS project should change this process because its
fundamental insight is exactly about the need to rethink the role and intensity
of competition in the international tax regime. However, such rethinking
cannot be found in the language of this action item. Disappointingly, it calls
for a "revamp" of current efforts, albeit with renewed spirit.
Revamp the work on harmful tax practices with a
priority on improving transparency, including compulsory
spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential
regimes, and on requiring substantial activity for any
preferential regime. It will take a holistic approach to
evaluate preferential tax regimes in the BEPS context. It will
engage with non-OECD members on the basis of the
56. The OECD has even discontinued the maintenance of its relevant
website. See also, e.g., Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: PoliticalReality Catches Up

With BEPS, 73 TAx NoTEs INT'L 387 (Feb. 3, 2014) (reviewing the past Harmful
Tax Competition campaign and concluding that the current initiative is also likely to
fail). For a more optimistic view of the campaign, yet one that includes a fair, and
not so favorable, evaluation of it, see Avi-Yonah, Harmful Tax Competition Report,
supra note 30.
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existing framework and consider revisions or additions to
the existing framework."
Realistically, it is probably essential to have a universal norm about
what is and is not acceptable in terms of preferential regimes. Acquiring
information about the regimes and their scope is important, of course, and
indeed action items 11 and 12 complement this item by calling for collection
of information on tax planning. This action item, however, should be more
important for the mission of the BEPS project because it deals with the
structure of the regime that permits taxpayers to engage in BEPS-type
planning. Yet it is not so much the knowledge about preferential tax regimes
that is concerning because our globalizing world realistically permits little
space for that; it is about the use of these regimes by taxpayers that concerns
tax authorities. It is necessary to secure the availability of such information,
yet it is not sufficient for two related reasons. First, so long as tax
competition dominates the international tax regime, the flow of information
can be improved, but never perfected because there is simply too much to
lose--or gain-from minor to major noncooperation. As has been proven to
date, defection is the rational course of action. Collective action led by the
most powerful countries could change this outcome, and indeed, this had
been understood and implemented with the constitution of the "Global
Forum" that shows promise in this context.58 The BEPS project should
complement this progress and overcome the second difficulty that prevented
success from the harmful tax competition campaign by a setting of standards.
Tax experts often favor smell tests for identification of too aggressive
planning schemes, yet that is not enough when the stakes are too high as they
are in this context. This is consistent with the first principle of BEPS-that
unilateral action can never overcome the BEPS challenge. Absent a universal
standard, countries are likely to either undershoot or overshoot when setting
their anti-abuse standards; their differing interests will continue to interpret
into a variety of standards, keeping the door open to BEPS planning.
The action plan does show some promise in this context. First, it
adds a vague yet meaningful reference to reliance on "substance"-as
opposed to only transparency-in the combat of harmful tax competition. 59
Then, it establishes what looks like a principle-a link between legitimate

57. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 5, at 18.
58. See the website of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes for its myriad actions and progress made:
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
59. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING,
supra note 10, at 17.
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tax planning and value creation.60 Although simple, many of the obviously
illegitimate preferential regimes should be caught in this principle if the
principle is clearly articulated. The action plan's commitment to a holistic
approach inherently calls for principle driven outcomes; this could be a
meaningful first step, although one should note that there is unfortunately no
sign that the BEPS project is heading in this direction.
A second positive sign within this admittedly disappointing action
item is the direct reference to the need to be inclusive and engage non-OECD
members in the process. Despite this reference, the language of this action
item hints that the OECD still views itself primarily as the rich countries'
club, which raises a question about its charge with the BEPS project. It is
unclear whether the OECD is a faithful agent of the G20, a partner of the
G20, or perhaps, completely independent of the G20 although engaged in a
discourse with it. This is important for the legitimacy of the BEPS project.
Recreating the "us" and "them" in this context is awkward and contrary to
the fundamental insight of BEPS about collaboration and the futility of
unilateralism. The key "them" countries-such as the BRICS-are G20
leaders, while many OECD members are not. Therefore, conflict may not
even be desirable for many OECD members-not to speak of the OECD as a
separate political institution. This is perhaps merely an unfortunate piece of
drafting, yet attention must be paid to it in order to eliminate the threat of
illegitimacy.

Finally, the most obvious outcome, or deliverable expected from this
action item should be the naming of at least the most obviously objectionable
regimes associated with BEPS.6 Unfortunately, the action plan refrains from
specifying any regimes, although a lot of talk has pointed to some of themmost notably to the so-called patent box regimes. It is generally thought that
these regimes will be specifically covered by the deliverables related to this
action item; 62 not doing so would clearly harm the legitimacy of the project.
60. See, e.g., id. at 18.

61. For a similar point and critique of this action item, see Joachim Englisch
& Anzhela Yevgenyeva, The "Upgraded" Strategy Against Harmful Tax Practices
Under the BEPS Action Plan, 5 BRIT. TAX REv. 620 (2013).
62. Nonetheless, there is expected to be severe political opposition to such
mentioning. The U.K.-following several European countries-has only recently
adopted a patent box regime, although with a somewhat mild effect due to which it is
expected to clear current standards. See, e.g., Jeffrey Owens, How the BEPS Project
Should Tackle Harmful Tax Competition, INT'L TAX REv. PREMIUM (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3275221 /How-the-BEPS-projectshould-tackle-harmful-tax-competition.html (the former person-in-charge of tax
matters at the OECD commenting on action item 5, advocating standard setting
similar to that supported by this Article, calling for an evaluation of patent box
regimes in light of these standards, yet assessing that the U.K. regime would clear
such an examination). But see David D. Stewart, BEPS Seen as Area of Both
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In conclusion, there is much uncertainty about the outcome of this
action item. Its direct tie to past failure of the OECD further reduces the
promise it may present. Yet this is an important pillar in the path to
international tax reform. Successful treading on such a path would require
consistency with the fundamental principles of BEPS. First, substantive,
principled standard setting should be an important part of the outcomebeyond enhanced transparency. A clear statement of the necessary tie
between value creation and tax jurisdiction would be a desirable first step.
Second, it must include a specification of what is and is not acceptablebeyond merely declaring a standard-and it is probably impractical to avoid
reference to political hot potatoes such as IP "boxes." Finally, this should be
achieved collaboratively in an inclusive manner, ensuring effectiveness and
winning the most legitimacy possible.
B.

The Specific Challenges

In the eye of the BEPS storm there are several specific measures that
are candidates for meaningful reform. These reforms may be the only
practical important outcome of BEPS, especially if the true uphill battle
towards an improved international tax regime based on cooperation and
coordination of tax policies is not quickly won.
1.

Action Item 2 ("Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch
Arrangements")

The most direct embodiment of BEPS planning-perhaps beyond its
transfer pricing elements-is the set of situations described in this action
item. The outcome and the problematic aspects of this type of tax planning
directly correspond to the key insight of BEPS: different countries
independently employ different-apparently incompatible, yet independently
logical-tax rules to similar circumstances, and consequently open the door
to arbitrage. Such arbitrage is widely considered abusive. From a technical
perspective, such arbitrage leads to what is widely called now "double nontaxation," that is, taxation of circumstances or transactions at a level that is
lower than they would have faced in a purely domestic setting. Double nonConsensus and Conflict, 140 TAx NOTES 1387 (Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Stewart,
BEPS Seen as Area of Both Consensus and Conflict] (quoting Robert Stack, the

United States Treasury deputy assistant secretary (international tax affairs),
questioning the United Kingdom's commitment to the initiative to combat profit
shifting and base erosion in light of its own patent box regime). Switzerland also has
voiced its intention to strongly protect its own patent box regime. See, e.g., Robert
Danon, Ed., Proceedings of the Swiss "Rethinking Corporate Tax Policy"

conference at the University of Lausanne (Dec. 9-10, 2013) (forthcoming 2014).
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taxation is a violation of "the single tax principle"--one of the fundamental
principles of the international tax regime. The first principle of BEPS
effectively enforces the single tax principle, requiring collaboration to close
the gaps between the rules that permit BEPS, in light of the understanding
that unilateral action-even when it is independently rational-simply
cannot do that. The action item responds to the challenge with a call to:
Develop
model
treaty
provisions
and
recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to
neutralise the effect (e.g. double non-taxation, double
deduction, long-term deferral) of hybrid instruments and
entities. This may include:
changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention to
(i)
ensure that hybrid instruments and entities (as well
as dual resident entities) are not used to obtain the
benefits of treaties unduly;
(ii)
domestic law provisions that prevent exemption or
non-recognition for payments that are deductible by
the payor;
(iii)
domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a
payment that is not includible in income by the
recipient (and is not subject to taxation under
controlled foreign company (CFC) or similar rules);
(iv)
domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a
payment that is also deductible in another
jurisdiction; and
63. Double non-taxation is the mirror image of double taxation, or overtaxation, of cross-border transactions that had long been acknowledged undesirable
as an obstacle to cross-border trade and investment. This goes back to post-WWI and
the League of Nations' work on tax treaties. See, e.g., Sunita Jogarajan, Stamp,
Seligman and the Drafting of the 1923 Experts' Report on Double Taxation, 5
WORLD TAX J. 368 (2013) (exposing the history of the League of Nations tax treaty
work and the centrality of double taxation to this work); A. J. van den Tempel,
RELIEF FROM DOUBLE TAXATION (IBFD, 1967) (extending the analysis to the
takeover of the tax treaty project by the OECD from the League of Nations). The
main milestone in the launch of double non-taxation as a corollary to double taxation
is probably its choice as a main issue in the 2004 IFA congress in Vienna. See IFA,
CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT'L, Vol. 89a (2004). For a review of the evolution of
the single tax principle, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax
Principle? An Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law,
Research Paper No. 318, 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract=2226309. The original
exposition of the single tax principle as a fundamental pillar of the international tax
regime was in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic
Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997).
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where necessary, guidance on co-ordination or tiebreaker rules if more than one country seeks to
apply such rules to a transaction or structure. Special
attention should be given to the interaction between
possible changes to domestic law and the provisions
of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This work
will be co-ordinated with the work on interest
expense deduction limitations, the work on CFC
rules, and the work on treaty shopping.64

Like most of the action plan, the struggle with hybrids is not new to
the OECD. In fact, just recently the OECD concluded work on the very same
problem, resulting in a 2012 report.65 The OECD generally points to this
report as a solution associated with action item two, although it has not
clearly clarified if more is to come on this. 66 The problem with this approach
is that the 2012 report was prepared and published prior to the BEPS
initiative. It was prepared under the former OECD approach and was not
based on the BEPS insight about the necessity of coordination to resolve the
collective action problem. Finally, the 2012 report was an OECD report and
did not give voice to the BEPS group of countries, however defined.
This is a conceptual conflict, not just a technical one. This is easy to
notice when reading the conclusions of the 2012 report. These conclusions
advocate domestic-law-based solutions, mainly anti-abuse rules to negate
some of the practices identified as abusive.6 ' The 2012 report reviewed a
variety of domestic anti-abuse norms that responded to various abusive
hybridization practices and concluded that they were successful in combating
such practices.6 8 Consequently, the report recommended the use of domestic
anti-abuse rules as a solution to the problem of hybrid mismatch
arrangements.69 Regardless of assessment of the quality of this conclusion
for OECD countries,7 o it is apparent that it contradicts the first principle of
64. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 2, at 15.
65. OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND
COMPLIANCE ISSUES (2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/HYBRIDSENG_
FinalOctober20l2.pdf [hereinafter OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS].
66. See, e.g., OECD, BEPS Action Plan,supra note 9.
67. OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 65, at 25.

68. Id. at 23-24.
69. Id. at 25.

70. And these conclusions should be doubted. Contrary to the OECD's
2012 report position, current treaty practice teaches us that domestic solutions are at
best partial and remedial, and at worst, they may further complicate the picture and
enhance the mismatches that generated the problem in the first place. Further, it
teaches us that remedial or small-scale treaty norms-such as beneficial ownership
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BEPS, based on the insight that unilateral action can never succeed in
curbing BEPS. It is not surprising that this conclusion is consistent with the
traditional OECD competition-promoting approach because the report was
prepared pursuant to that approach and at a time when such an approach
dominated OECD practice.
Now, hybrid mismatch arrangements include various challenges in
practice. One group of challenges concerns entity classification issues,
including well-known issues regarding the treatment of partnerships under
tax treaties, 7' the classification and tax treatment of other transparent and
hybrid entities, and the classification of nontraditional relevant norms, such
as the United States' check-the-box regime ("CTB") that permits essentially
at-will elective changes of entity classification.7 2
A second group of challenges concerns hybrid instruments, such as
derivative financial instruments. The challenge is to reconcile the
classification of such instruments among the competing or relevant tax
jurisdictions. The primary choice here is between debt and equity
classifications that have been done using a binary, all-or-nothing decision
rule essentially in all jurisdictions.
Finally, a third group of challenges concerns classification of
potential hybrid transactions. These may be financial transactionsprincipally similar to the derivative instruments already described-or
transactions involving intangibles-such as software-where the different
countries involved classify them differently, leading to situations where
certain benefits could be claimed twice. For example, if two countries view
different taxpayers as "owners" of a certain property, they could both claim
depreciation or amortization deductions at the same time for that property.73

and the conflict of qualification commentaries-are insufficient. See, e.g., Michael
Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer & Alfred Storck, BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP: RECENT TRENDS (IBFD, 2013).
71. See OECD, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION
TO PARTNERSHIPS (OECD, Issues in International Taxation, No. 6, 1999) [hereinafter
OECD, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION TO
PARTNERSHIPS]; MICHAEL LANG, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX
CONVENTION TO PARTNERSHIPS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT PREPARED
BY THE OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS (Linde Verlag Wien, 2000)
[hereinafter LANG, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT PREPARED BY THE
OECD].
72. Reg. § 301.7701-3. CTB apparently came under significant scrutiny in
the BEPS context, yet the United States appears adamant on keeping it. See, e.g.,
Stewart, BEPS Seen as Area of Both Consensus and Conflict, supra note 62.

73. See, e.g., an example of this in an aircraft-leasing context, T.A.M. 199748-005 (August 19, 1997).
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As is well known from practice experience 4-and more recently
from studies performed by several countries, with more countries joining the
process-there is a wide variety of opportunities to abuse such mismatches,
leading to the conclusion that only coordination may prevent it.75 Whatever
solution is adopted, not all countries are expected to end up winners in
revenue and short-term welfare terms. Therefore, spontaneous coordination
is unlikely to occur. Nonetheless, neither the 2012 report nor the BEPS
project reports have addressed the challenge of coordination.
Rather, the reports focus solely on the technical details and the most
obvious issues attracting public attention: transactions that twice took
advantage of a deduction for a single expense, transactions where an expense
was deducted yet the income generated by it was not included in income, and
transactions that generate the benefit of foreign tax credits beyond the
taxation of the underlying income-known as foreign tax generators. These
transactions are considered undesirable because of the revenue lost and the
unintended competitive advantage they provide to MNEs-manifested in
inefficiency and unfairness. Note that it is not obvious that incentivizing
MNEs is per se desirable, and this may very well be a major motivation
behind the norm of the current international tax regime. Essentially all
countries incentivize R&D and transfers of intangibles, which are the very
reason for the existence of MNEs. Essentially all countries use the arm's
length principle and typically the concept of arm's length range-again to
74. The many examples include the so-called DCL cases, where United
States and United Kingdom domestic actions failed to remedy a double deduction of
losses situation-the very same issue raised by the 2012 report-eventually resorting
to coordination via a competent authorities agreement. See, e.g., Lewis J. Greenwald
& Jeffrey L. Rubinger, The New UK-US. Agreement on Dual ConsolidatedLosses,

113 TAX NOTES 841 (Nov. 27, 2006). Other well-known conflicts include the
differences in corporate residence rules that are not currently resolved. It is generally
understood that a simple tiebreaker cannot be designed in such situation where the
conflict is substantive. See, e.g., Robert Couzin, CORPORATE RESIDENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (IBFD, 2002). A similar problem exists with respect to
partnerships and hybrid and other transparent entities. See, e.g., OECD, THE
APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION TO PARTNERSHIPS, supra

note 71; LANG, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT PREPARED BY THE OECD,

supra note 71; Martin H. Seevers, Taxation of Partnershipsand PartnersEngaged
in InternationalTransactions:Issues in Cross Border Transactionsin Germany and
the US., 2 HOuS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 143 (2001).
75. See, e.g., AUSTL. TREASURY DEP'T, SCOPING PAPER ON RISKS TO THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF AUSTRALIA'S CORPORATE TAX BASE (2013), http://www.

treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2013/Aus-Corporate-Tax-BaseSustainability/HTML; Svethan-Eric Birsch & Christoph Spengel, Hybrid Mismatch
Arrangements: OECD Recommendations and German Practice, 67 BULL. INT'L
TAX. 520 (2013); Omar Zuiiga, The New Mexican BEPS Legislation, 73 TAX NOTES
INT'L 77 (Jan. 7, 2014).
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the sole benefit of MNEs. So, not only is a normative analysis missing in
the action plan, but also a serious evaluation of the principles of the current
system.
This difficulty is exacerbated when the solutions proposed are
domestic and are specific anti-abuse rules ("SAARs"), not general anti-abuse
rules ("GAARs"). GAARs are rejected because they primarily target
artificial arrangements when the target of the hybrids challenge is nonartificial arrangements. Finally, the 2012 report advocates more exchange of
information. This approach is not consistent with the principles of BEPS. It
is diametrically opposite to the first principle as already explained; it
advocates ad hoc solutions to the most visible symptoms rather than a
holistic solution, as is required by the second principle of BEPS, and it
completely lacks innovation or even a consideration of a new approach to the
issue.
Neither the 2012 report nor the action plan mention the difficulty of
dealing with mismatches not only of rules but also of their implementation. It
is likely that the single largest contributor to the issues that triggered the
attention to BEPS is the distortion created by the implementation of transfer
pricing valuation techniques by United States MNEs, supported by the
courts' endorsement of the literal arm's length principle." Coordinating
implementation is indeed a difficult task, yet the action item comes very
short of trying to deal with the problem. It states that only "where necessary,
guidance on co-ordination or tie-breaker rules" will be considered.79 Again,
this shortcut approach is apparently inconsistent with the BEPS principles. 80
Specifically, the intangibles valuation issue may fare better under action item
eight, discussed below, yet it should be mentioned here that that would
require accepting innovation, consistent with the third principle of BEPS.
In conclusion, at this time, action item two does not provide hope for
progress, despite its centrality to the BEPS project. As explained, only
adherence to the principles of BEPS-particularly an implementation of a
collaborative process-would give it a chance of success.

76. See, e.g., Brauner, Value, supra note 5.
77. See, e.g., id; Yariv Brauner, Cost Sharingand the Acrobatics ofArm's
Length Taxation, 38 INTERTAX 554 (2010) [hereinafter Brauner, Cost Sharing].
78. Brauner, Cost Sharing,supranote 77.
79. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 2, at 15.
80. Note, however, that considering an enhanced use of the tie-breaking
rule is positive because it provides a decision rule that must be agreed upon
collectively and has proven useful in other contexts.
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Action Item 3 ("Strengthen CFC Rules")

At face value, this is indeed an important component of an antiBEPS initiative. Deferral is an important feature of tax planning in the
United States, as well as most other productive countries. Therefore reform
of anti-deferral regimes-such as CFC rules-supposedly makes sense
within the project. It is not only important but also relevant because the
schemes that brought BEPS to the top of the agenda exposed some of the
most conspicuous failures of the United States' subpart F regime8
including the inability to capture royalty income from foreign exploitation of
intangibles of United States MNEs and the use of the so-called same country
exception in the "Dutch Sandwich" scheme. 8 2
Nonetheless, the action item and its preamble lack much content.
The action item calls for "[d]evelop[ing] recommendations regarding the
design of controlled foreign company rules. This work will be co-ordinated
,,83
This presumably means that the OECD
with other work as necessary.
views the CFC rules as domestic regimes that-perhaps due to domestic
political pressures or even incompetence-do not follow best practices. In
response, the OECD presumably expects to specify such best practices to
assist countries in implementing these necessary domestic norms. The action
item does not even strongly commit to specific coordination of the work on
action item three with other action items, using the vague statement "as
necessary. ,,84 Resorting to best practices guidance may be practical and
necessary, or even the sole realistic progress available for the OECD; yet the
OECD should be aware of the fact that this guidance is inconsistent with the
first principle of BEPS and that therefore it is likely to eventually fail.
To understand the difficulty of reforming CFC regimes, one must
recall that the OECD views such regimes as purely domestic anti-abuse
rules. Pursuant to these regimes, the country of residence of a parent
corporation ("P"), for example, is permitted to currently tax income
generated by a foreign subsidiary of such parent corporation ("ForSub").

81. This is Subpart F of the Code, §§ 951-960, which includes the United
rules.
CFC
States'
82. These schemes were widely exposed elsewhere. See, e.g., supra notes
2-3.
83. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 3, at 16.
84. Id.

85. See OECD, Commentary, supra note 20, at art. 1, 23; art. 7, T 14; and
art. 10, T 37, all added in 1992 (and later modified, yet not substantively). See also
OECD, CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION (1996) [hereinafter OECD,
CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION] (including the original comparative
study of CFC regimes by the OECD).

Florida Tax Review

86

[Vol. 16:2

Normally, countries refrain from taxing "foreign source" income86 of
nonresidents-such as ForSub--even when such nonresidents are strongly
related or even wholly owned by residents, thus permitting deferral of
domestic taxation of such income as a general rule. Tax treaties, if
applicable, explicitly forbid such taxation. Yet many countries were
concerned that deferral might be abused in some cases by taxpayers diverting
income to corporations with residence in low-tax jurisdictions solely to
minimize taxation. One solution for this concern has been to enact CFC
legislation that specified such potentially abusive circumstances and
typically provided that when appropriate they would view the income earned
by the foreign corporation (ForSub in our example) as if it were earned
directly by the resident (P in our example), leading to current taxation and
eliminating the benefits of deferral. Different countries use different
technical mechanisms to achieve the same ends, yet they all refrain from
directly limiting the tax jurisdiction of the source country (ForSub's country
of residence), and therefore they view their CFC regimes as entirely
"domestic," taxing residents (such as P) on "their" income-even though the
income became "their" income as a consequence of the atypical attribution
rule embedded in the CFC regimes themselves. The OECD accepted the
position that such regimes are indeed purely domestic, primarily because
they do not directly restrict the tax jurisdictions exclusively assigned by tax
treaties to source jurisdictions (such as ForSub's country of residence).
This is another prime example for this Article's claim that the
international tax regime is based on competition rather than coordination.
Realistically, these circumstances involve a source country that taxes certain
income too lightly in the view of a residence country. It does so with the aim
to attract investment or rents. The residence country also "competes" on the
world market by adhering to deferral as a general rule. This is typically
explained as helpful for domestic MNEs competing for foreign investment
(such as investment in ForSub's country of residence).89 Yet the residence
country needs to balance the support of its MNEs with concerns about the
abuse opportunity that deferral provides. CFC regimes are attempts to set this
balance unilaterally without correspondence with the source jurisdiction
86. That is, income with no acceptable links to the jurisdiction of P's
country of residence.
87. Typically in art. 7, 1, such as that of the 2010 OECD Model Tax
Convention.
88. Id.

89. See, e.g., the debate over the legislation of the United States' Subpart F
regime that reflected a compromise between the desire of the Kennedy
administration to eliminate deferral and the competitiveness concerns of other
political figures. See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960; H.R.
REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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involved. The more straightforward solution of coordination of tax policies
among the residence and source countries never comes into consideration
because the countries are first and foremost in competition with each other
and with all other countries. Consequently, the policies of the source and
residence countries are not reconciled; they either overlap, resulting in
potential double taxation, or create gaps of coverage resulting in double nontaxation to the advantage of MNEs. The latter is the more likely consequence
due to the resolve and power of MNEs.90 Therefore, there should be no
reason to believe that continuing down this path-contrary to the most
fundamental insight of BEPS-would lead to better results.
In addition, one may question the wisdom of the choice to focus on
CFC regimes here despite the intuition implied above that they belong. As
mentioned in the preamble to the action item, the OECD has not done much
work in this area beyond legitimizing CFC legislation as not contradictory to
tax treaty obligations. CFC regimes are a common title for a variety of legal
constructs that tax income from foreign investment of resident taxpayers.91
Nonetheless, the value of deferral is not merely the time value of money
supposedly gained, but is in ancillary rules and potential rate changes that
make deferral attractive for tax planning. 92 These different methods have
slightly different goals and effects and so it may prove tricky to develop
"best practices" here.
Moreover, an analysis of the most notorious BEPS schemes
demonstrates that the primary damage to the home or residence countries in
such transactions-typically the United States-had nothing to do with their
indeed weak CFC rules, but rather with their transfer pricing rules. One may
argue that it would not matter if such countries repealed deferral,93 yet this is
90. In the United States this is clearly the case, as economists have
extensively discovered with access to actual tax return data in recent years. See, e.g.,
Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative
Proposalsfor the Reform of InternationalTax, 66 NAT'L TAX J. 671 (2013); Harry
Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of US. Multinational Company
Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 247

(2012). Also, notably, law Professor Edward D. Kleinbard explored this
phenomenon in a wider scope than CFC regimes. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless
Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income].
91. See, for example, the OECD's own comparative study in OECD,
CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION, supra note 85. See also a recent
study of these regimes in Peter Schmidt, The Taxation ofForeign PassiveIncome for
Groups and Companies, 98a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT'L 259 (2013).

92. As explained in DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL
(2014).
93. This is a viable option, often advocated for a variety of reasons
unrelated to BEPS. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E.
TAXATION

Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of US. Tax on Foreign Source

Income, 52 SMU L. REv. 455 (1999).
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beside the point because fixing CFC rules is not about the repeal of deferral;
on the contrary, the rules define the boundaries of permitted deferral. As
mentioned by the OECD in the preamble to the action item, it is not only the
residence country that benefits from effective CFC rules. Indeed, the Google
case demonstrates this point because its "Double-Dutch" scheme effectively
reduced the Irish rather than the United States' taxation of Google. Yet
Ireland in that scheme is not exactly the source jurisdiction, which reduces
the justification of focusing on CFC regimes within the BEPS project.
This does not mean that tightening the CFC rules may not help in
curbing some BEPS through increased costs for tax planning or the reveal of
some information, yet it should be noted that it is no cure-all and
acknowledged that its potential is limited in this context.94
3.

Action Item 4 ("Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deductions
and Other FinancialPayments")

This is perhaps the most actively promising action item according to
common speculation among the international tax community. This action
items calls for the OECD to:
Develop recommendations regarding best practices
in the design of rules to prevent base erosion through the use
of interest expense, for example through the use of relatedparty and third-party debt to achieve excessive interest
deductions or to finance the production of exempt or
deferred income, and other financial payments that are
economically equivalent to interest payments. The work will
evaluate the effectiveness of different types of limitations. In
connection with and in support of the foregoing work,
transfer pricing guidance will also be developed regarding
the pricing of related party financial transactions, including
financial and performance guarantees, derivatives (including
internal derivatives used in intra-bank dealings), and captive

94. For one proposal that takes into account the second-best properties of
this option, see Stephen E. Shay, Modernizing U.S. CFC Rules: A Minimum Tax to
Limit Deferral, 16 FLA. TAX REv. (forthcoming 2014) (proposing a minimum
interim tax that effectively limits the benefits of deferral for low-taxed foreign
income with the view of ameliorating pressure on MNEs to retain excess earnings
abroad).
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and other insurance arrangements. The work will be coordinated with the work on hybrids and CFC rules. 95
Much like the former action item, action item four seems to aim-at
most-at developing best practices. Limitations on the deduction of interest
expenses are naturally a matter for domestic laws in practice. Tax treaties
generally refrain from regulating the deductions side of tax laws. Originally
focused on elimination of double taxation and facilitation of exchanges of
information, tax treaties leave the design of tax bases to the relevant
domestic laws. Moreover, the general deductibility rules are quite universal
and straightforward within the income tax world. They all generally follow
the matching principle-the matching of an expense with income it is
intended to generate-and a tracing norm.96 Therefore, little dispute has
arisen regarding the fundamentals of the deductions rules.
The various limitations imposed by different countries' domestic
laws on such deductions are much less universal, yet again, they are
perceived as part of countries' domestic anti-abuse rules-the differences
among which are to be tolerated on principle.97 Economic double taxation or
non-taxation may result, yet there is little agreement on how to handle that
issue, and tax treaties are generally unconcerned with deductions beyond
tangential issues.
Nonetheless, the BEPS project has exposed the extent of use of
interest expense tax planning by MNEs. 99 United States MNEs heavily
employ interest expense tax planning strategies, primarily through related
party financing arrangements and the use of derivatives and other
sophisticated financing transactions. This discussion shall separate these two
strategies. First, United States' interest expense allocation strategies
95. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 4, at 17.
96. The most notable exception is the United States' interest expense
allocation rules. Reg. § 1.861-9T. Note that R&D expenses enjoy a more universal
benefit that overrules tracing due to the belief in the desirability of R&D.
97. See, e.g., OECD, Commentary, supra note 20, art. 1,% 9.2, 22.1.
98. For a comprehensive and critical review of both existing and potentially
available methods to address debt finance issues, see Chloe Burnett, IntraGroup
Debt at the Crossroads:Stand Alone Versus Worldwide Approach, 6 WORLD TAX J.
1 (2014) (assessing the pros and cons of the various options-especially the pros and

cons of a worldwide approach versus a fixed ratio rule of some kind, finding the
former superior. The analysis-done in the context of the BEPS project and action
item 4 of the action plan-notes-similarly to this Article-that such a solution is
also more compatible with the multilateral approach that is consistent with the BEPS
project principles).
99. OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note

10.
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generally wish to "import" deductions, that is, allocate them against the
taxpayer's domestic source income. At the most rudimentary level, it allows
a taxpayer to reduce current domestic income, which is usually highly taxed.
Second, it usually increases the ratio of foreign source income for the
taxpayer and increases the ability to "absorb" foreign taxes. 00 Note that such
domestic tax base erosion is not generally disallowed. It is solely limited to
arm's length interest transactions, to nonexcessive leveraging-due to the
divergent thin capitalization rules applied domestically, yet very differently,
by most countries-and, in some cases, by specific, yet limited, rules.' 0' The
BEPS project concludes that these limitations have been ineffective or
inadequate.
Yet despite this complicated picture and the divergent norms, this
is-as already mentioned-perhaps the most actively promising action item.
The hope is that countries will be able to agree on coordinated solutions that
are the hallmark of the BEPS project. These solutions would occur despite
the question of the utility and sense of such convergence of rules. One can
note this in the language that calls for coordination of this action item's
deliverables with those of the former CFC action item-where one cannot
find language calling for coordination with this item. Indeed, interest
expense shifting strategies may augment the impact of deferral strategies,
yet-as already mentioned-it is not clear how problematic interest expense
shifting strategies are. The symbolism of reaching consensus on a converged
and coordinated norm is important, being consistent with the first principle
of BEPS, yet the magnitude of its real impact is unclear. It may even be the
case that the BEPS project will need a symbol-a single coordination
success story, the importance of which cannot be discounted because it will
demonstrate the falsity of the argument that it is not realistic to expect
countries to steer away from maximal tax competition.
It is unclear at this time what will be the destiny of the related issue
of derivatives and other financially innovative transactions that do not seem
to be on the agenda of the OECD.10 2 It is likely that most of the BEPS-related
discussion concerning these will take place within the discussion of hybrids
under action item two.
In conclusion, despite the careful language of this action item that
takes a conservative approach leading to perfection of best practices at the
domestic level, it seems that in this context such best practices must include
100. See, e.g., Compaq v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001),
rev'g 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
101. The United States provides an example for the third instance because it
uses an assets-based formulary interest expense allocation norm. Reg. § 1.861-9T.
102. Beyond the BEPS project, however, see OECD, AGGRESSIVE TAX
PLANNING BASED ON AFTER TAx HEDGING (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
aggressive/aftertaxhedgingreport.pdf.
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actual solutions on which countries would be expected to converge. This
gives de facto hope that would mean countries were reaching for a
coordinated approach of some power-consistently with the first principle of
BEPS. Moreover, the lack of success of most relevant domestic anti-abuse
rules to date, combined with rumor about the solutions contemplated by the
OECD, lead to a reasonable expectation that the OECD will consider
innovative--or less used-mechanisms here. This is consistent with the third
principle of BEPS. Interestingly, the United States uses an unconventional,
formulary norm for interest expense allocation.103 The question is whether
the OECD will be willing to go in that direction because formulary
apportionment has long been within the OECD's "blind spot."
4.

Action Item 6 ("Prevent Treaty Abuse')

Action item six may be categorized in the former section as a
general, overarching action item due to its nature, referring to tax treaties as a
whole rather than to a specific set of norms. Yet this Article places this
action item within this section because it concerns a set of rules that are not
included elsewhere in the action plan. Moreover, the general understanding
in the tax community is that action item six will likely focus on a very
specific set of rather familiar norms, despite its more general scope applying
to the entire tax treaties sphere. The action item mandates the OECD to:
Develop
model
treaty
provisions
and
recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to
prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances. Work will also be done to clarify that tax
treaties are not intended to be used-to generate double nontaxation and to identify the tax policy considerations that, in
general, countries should consider before deciding to enter
into a tax treaty with another country. The work will be coordinated with the work on hybrids.10 4
Preventing treaty abuse was not specifically identified in the
OECD's initial BEPS report. The competition-based nature of the
international tax regime led to significant ignoring of this notion. In the
United States, tax treaties play a diminished role. This diminished role led
one of the top tax treaty experts to reject the idea of treaty abuse by means of

103. See supranote 101 and accompanying text.
104. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND
note 10, Action 6, at 19.
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arbitrage. 05 Elsewhere, tests have been developed to prevent the "improper
use of treaties"l 0 6 -an obviously softer language than abuse and avoidance.
In any event, treaty abuse generally has been considered a domestic
law issue. It has been tackled with mechanisms such as the controversial
beneficial ownership concept,' 07 specific treaty anti-abuse rules in domestic
law, 08 and specific treaty-based provisions. The latter included, limited adhoc "subject to tax" clauses, switchover mechanisms, and limitation on
benefits ("LOB")' 09 provisions that indirectly serve as specific treaty antiabuse mechanisms."o Little convergence has developed for these measures,
even among OECD countries. The language of action item six charges the
OECD with promoting convergence-it seems-developing best practices in
the use of the various measures.
Awkwardly, the BEPS project states-with concern-that the
bilateral structure of the international tax regime has lost its integrity. The
action plan expresses dismay about the use of "third party structures"presumably the use of entities that are residents in countries where there is
little economic justification other than tax for such use-and about the use of
multiple layers between residence and source-again, presumably
unjustifiably. More specifically, the report identifies as problematic the lowtaxed foreign branches, the use of conduit companies, and the artificial
shifting of income through transfer pricing. The suggested response is to
105. H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. TillinghastLecture: International
Tax Arbitrage and the "InternationalTax System," 53 TAx L. REV. 137, 164 (2000)
(discussing Tillinghast's lecture delivered on October 1, 1998).
106. See, e.g., STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE

OF TAx TREATIES:
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE To THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES
(1998) [hereinafter VAN WEEGHEL, IMPROPER USE]; PHILIP BAKER, IMPROPER USE
OF TAx TREATIES, TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION (2013), http://www.un.org/

esa/ffd/tax/2013TMTTAN/Paper9ABaker.pdf.
107. This is a defunct concept; a historical mistake that exists in tax treaties
merely due to the insistence of tax authorities to hang on to it, believing it to be a
weapon in their anti-abuse arsenal. For a comprehensive recent review and analysis
of the concept and its use, see, for example, IBFD, BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: RECENT
TRENDS (Michael Lang et al. eds., IBFD 2013) [hereinafter IBFD, BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP].

108. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 894(c) (United States' domestic rule denying treaty
benefits for certain payments effected through reverse hybrid entities).
109. For a detailed technical analysis of the provisions, see, for example,
Howard J. Levine & Michael J. Miller, U.S. Income Tax Treaties-The Limitation on
Benefits Article, 936-1 TAx MGMT. PORT. (BNA) (2013). For a recent critique, see,
for example, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Searching for the Uncertain Rationale
Underlying the US Treasury's Anti-treaty Shopping Policy, 40 INTERTAX 245 (2012)
[hereinafter Fleming, Uncertain Rationale].
110. For a more comprehensive review and analysis of these mechanisms,
see, for example, VAN WEEGHEL, IMPROPER USE, supra note 106.
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more closely align the allocation of income with the economic activity that
generates that income.
The test of the BEPS project will be its ability to stay consistent with
its fundamental principles. The easy way out would be to continue to
evaluate domestic, ad hoc solutions rather than to emphasize principles. Such
solutions have been tried-repeatedly-with little success."' Other
solutions-such as "subject to" tax clauses-may be contrary to the policies
and interests of some countries, and therefore are unlikely to work absent a
multilateral agreement of some sort. Yet it should be apparent that the BEPS
project is the forum for that; it is the best opportunity presented to date for
progress on the multilateral agreement front. Finally, some solutions-such
as LOB clauses-are limited in scope as they address limited abuses of the
residence concept. Note also that the content of LOB clauses-even in the
United States-is unsettled and partially controversial.1 12 It would be
disappointing if this action item resulted in a set of recommendations to
simply universally adopt these rules. However, if a multilateral initiative
considered some specific solutions, and, maybe more importantly,
encouraged and also considered innovative solutions, the BEPS project could
declare progress. That progress would also be consistent with the first and
third principles of BEPS.
A more realistic achievement-and one that has rather strong
support in the BEPS project developments to date-is the potential clear
articulation of double non-taxation as a core principle of the international tax
regime in general and tax treaties in particular. The BEPS report and action
plan include perhaps the strongest double non-taxation language generated to
date by the OECD. Elevation of the single tax principle to a superior status
would be helpful in the interpretation of many treaty conflicts-regardless of
the outcome of the BEPS project. Moreover, arbitrary measures dressed like
domestic anti-abuse rules may now be challenged against a clear principlea mechanism that is missing at the present. This action would be consistent
with all three fundamental principles of BEPS.
Finally, the awkward statement of intent, "preservation of the
bilateral structure," should be reconsidered. If this is indeed a multilateral
project intended to provide useful solutions through coordination, it is the
coordination and multilateralism that must be emphasized from the
beginning and not bilateralism as such. This does not mean that only an allor-nothing multilateral treaty will do. It may take time for such a treaty to
materialize-if at all-yet the designing of current progress with a view of
111. Tax authorities even cling to beneficial ownership. See, e.g., Jakob
Bundgaard, The Notion of Beneficial Ownership in Danish Tax Law: The Creation
of a New Legal Order with Uncertainty as a Companion, in IBFD, BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP, supra note 107, at 91.
112. See, e.g., Fleming, UncertainRationale, supra note 109.
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the final goal will make such design more effective and less likely to be
destructive in the process of reaching a multilateral tax treaty of any sort.
Note that action item 15 makes the quest for a multilateral tax instrument an
explicit goal of the BEPS project.' 13
5.

Action Item 7 ("Prevent the Artificial Avoidance of PE
Status")

This is an interesting action item. It deals with a reform of the
international tax regime rules applicable to business income-perhaps the
most important aspect and the key fuel of cross-border investment. These
rules provide that only meaningful presence of business conducted by a
nonresident would trigger taxation by the source country-where the
business is conducted. They establish a PE threshold to determine the
instances when business would be considered meaningful enough to trigger
source taxation. Revision of the PE definition rules 1 l4 and of the operative
attribution of profits to PE rules"s has been a constant on the OECD's
agenda in recent times-unrelated to BEPS."'6 Overall, the trend in the
OECD has been to elevate the PE threshold, seeking to maximize residence
rather than source taxation. At the same time, this revision faced criticism,
primarily from emerging economies, such as India and China. These
emerging economies sought an opposite movement: lowering the PE
threshold to expand source taxation. Against this background, the OECD is
charged by the action item to "[d]evelop changes to the definition of PE to
prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status in relation to BEPS, including
through the use of commissionaire arrangements and the specific activity
exemptions. Work on these issues will also address related profit attribution
issues."' 17
The language of this action item does not reveal the significant work
already done by the OECD on PEs. It seems very narrow and limited to
BEPS-related threats-only two of which are mentioned: the use of
commissionaire arrangements and specific activity exemptions.

113. Note that gradual or even partial convergence is possible and could be
useful. See Brauner, Crystallization,supra note 17.

114.2010 OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION art. 5.
115. Id. art. 7.
116. For the most recent examples, see OECD, OECD MODEL TAX
CONVENTION:

REVISED

PROPOSALS

CONCERNING

THE

INTERPRETATION

AND

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 5 (PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT) (2012-2013) [hereinafter
OECD, ARTICLE 5 PROPOSALS]; and the 2010 OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION art.
7 and commentary.
117. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra

note 10, Action 7, at 19.
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Yet the OECD chose to put the major Article 5 project on hold and
gave preference to the BEPS project; this decision hints that the OECD
clearly views this action item as having a wider scope than its language
reveals.'

8

The issues specifically identified in this action item are: (I)
Commissionaire arrangements-countries interpret the agency PE rules so
that sale of goods may be negotiated without source taxation, leading MNEs
to replace source state distributors with commissionaire arrangements that
permit this interpretation with little to no real change in operations;" 9 and
(II) MNEs artificially fragment their operations among multiple group
entities to ameliorate the meaningfulness of each, and to qualify for the
"preparatory and ancillary" exceptions to PE status.120 Note that the OECD
identified very specific instances where it saw abuse, but only with respect to
the technical elements of Article 5; Article 7 and the interaction between
Articles 5 and 7-which may perhaps belong to the transfer pricing action
items-were completely ignored. As was the case with the Authorized
OECD Approach ("AOA"), the treaty side of the OECD-presumably
working party 1-gives way to the transfer pricing side-working party 6on the analysis of attribution of profits, as if the questions of status and
attribution are independent of each other. This is the traditional view, yet it is
problematic. A second immediate observation is that many of the issues that
occupied the time and attention of the OECD's pre-BEPS project are not
being addressed; these include the meaning of the "at the disposal of'
language, the use of subcontractors, the time requirements, the presence of
foreign personnel in the host country, the meaning of place of management,
the "to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise" language, the
entrepreneurial risks, and more.121 Finally, despite the contribution of
political pressure by developing and emerging economies that led to the
BEPS project, there is little attention to the main sources of complaints by
such countries against the current design of the PE regime by the OECD. The
action item does follow a general direction of protecting source taxation, yet
it does not address the specific issues that countries such as India and China
118. See, e.g., Stephanie Soon Johnston, OECD's Final Work on
PermanentEstablishments on Holdfor BEPS, Official Says, 2013 WTD 108-3 (June

2013).
119. See, e.g., In re Boston Scientific, Cass., sez. cinque, 9 marzo 2012, n.
3769 (It.), unofficial translation at 2012 WTD 72-18; Soci6t6 Zimmer Limited v.

Ministbre de L'Economie, des Finances and et de l'Industrie, Conseil d'Etat [CE]
[supreme administrative court], Mar. 31, 2010, Rec. Lebon 304715 & 308525 (Fr.);
Dell Prods. v. Skatt Ost, ref 10-032855ASD-BORG/03 (Nor.).

120. Revision of the "preparatory and ancillary" language was part of the
now-suspended work on Article 5 conducted by the OECD. See OECD, ARTICLE 5
PROPOSALS, supra note 116.
121. Id.
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have been raising in the last few years. There is no consideration of the
service PE concept, no discussion of changes to construction PE rules, no
mention of the digital PE option-although that mention may come up in
action item one, which is more generally devoted to the challenges posed by
the digital economy 12 2-and, finally, no reevaluation of the agency-or the
subsidiary-PE concept as a whole.
In conclusion, the challenge faced by the OECD in this action item is
somewhat different than what it faces elsewhere. The immediate triggers of
BEPS did not involve significant abuse of the PE rules, yet certain aspects of
these rules-particularly the agency PE and the service PE versionstriggered much controversy and destabilized the international tax regime.
The key principle of BEPS in play here should be the second principle that
requires a holistic approach to tax reform. As always, an inclusive,
collaborative effort presents the best chance of success-more so than
anywhere in this case where the primary complaint comes from G20 leaders
that are not OECD members. The test of the BEPS project in this context
would be whether it comprehensively revises the business income rules or
merely patches up only the wounds affected by the most conspicuous thorns.
C.

Transfer Pricing
1.

Action Items 8-10 ("Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes
Are in Line With Value Creation")

Aggressive transfer pricing is the beating heart of BEPS planningthe sine qua non of the transactions that triggered the universal interest in
BEPS and eventually the BEPS project. The essence of these transactions
was the ability to "move" intangibles away from the United States and its
high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction. The basic intuition was to
exploit United States-originated intangibles outside the jurisdiction by
carving out the compound of rights and to prevent the United States from
taxing income generated by these rights. In the past, United States'
legislators and regulators had contemplated such exportation of property in
general and intangible property in particular. They responded with several
rules that clarified their disapproval of the legitimacy of such tax planning
and attempted to shut down the opportunities to effectuate it.123 When this
action made exportation very difficult, taxpayers resorted to a scheme that
used cost sharing to effectively export the abovementioned foreign rights in
122. Although indication has recently been received that the United States
will oppose a digital PE rule. See Sheppard, The DigitalEconomy, supra note 49.
123. Two well-known examples are the super-royalty rule of Code section
367(d) and the "commensurate with income" language added to section 482 in the
1980s to explicitly eliminate the benefits of intangibles exportation.
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their intangibles to low-tax jurisdictions-primarily Ireland, but also
Luxembourg and other known jurisdictions. Cost sharing is a safe-harbor
regime that shields qualified taxpayers from regulatory scrutiny, primarily
from the application of the United States' partnership taxation rules and the
normal transfer pricing rules.1 24 Cost sharing is still a regime unique to the
United States' transfer pricing rules, both in its scope and its "generosity" to
taxpayers. Its origins and purpose are unclear,125 yet its effect is enormous,
allowing thousands of United States MNEs to avoid repatriation and tax
payment on trillions of dollars of their foreign profits.12 6
Once these intangibles were parked in the low-tax jurisdiction, the
MNEs would structure their business worldwide in a manner that would
maximize the profits shifted to these low-tax jurisdictions at the expense of
the countries where they operated using multiple schemes.' 27 These are the
notorious BEPS schemes that are now exposed through the BEPS project and
related media exposure. These sophisticated tax-planning schemes all rely on
the simple use of transfer pricing-the cost sharing opportunity and the bias
inherent in the arm's length-based rules in favor of MNEs. This bias is
particularly pronounced for MNEs with a larger intangible component in

their businesses.12 8
Indeed, the insufficiency of current transfer pricing rules regulating
intangibles has been acknowledged by the OECD and was acted upon prior
to the BEPS project.129 Unlike the PE project, this project seems not to have
been shelved for BEPS. This is probably a positive sign because intangibles
are at the heart of the BEPS issue, and proper transfer pricing treatment of
intangibles should not be different for BEPS purposes or for the perhaps
more limited OECD purposes-the challenge is the same. Appropriately,
action item eight ("Intangibles") is the first transfer pricing action item:
Develop rules to prevent BEPS by moving
intangibles among group members. This will involve: (i)
adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of
intangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated with the
124. For a more detailed explanation of this regime, see Brauner, Cost
Sharing, supra note 77.
125. See, e.g., id.
126. See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN & Co., NORTH AMERICAN EQUITY RESEARCH,
U.S. EQUITY STRATEGY FLASH (2011) (stating a $1.4 trillion figure in 2011).

127. See, e.g., the transactions described supra notes 2-3; Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, supra note 90.
128. See, e.g., Brauner, Value, supra note 5.
129. The OECD published a discussion draft first in June 2012, and a

revised draft in July 2013. See OECD, DiscussioN DRAFT ON TRANSFER PRICING
ASPECTS OF INTANGIBLES (2012); OECD, REVISED
TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF INTANGIBLES (2013).
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transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in
accordance with (rather than divorced from) value creation;
(iii) developing transfer pricing rules or special measures for
transfers of hard-to-value intangibles; and (iv) updating the
guidance on cost contribution arrangements.130
The intimate relationship between the intangibles and BEPS projects
obviously makes sense and the same experts will-and should-work on
both. Yet, responding to the intangibles challenge is perhaps the most
difficult test of the BEPS project and of the consistency of the action plan
deliverables with the project's fundamental principles. Most critical would
be the adherence to the third principle of BEPS: being willing to consider an
overhaul of current rules and an adoption of innovative solutions. In this
context it primarily means allowing for formulary elements to be considered,
beyond the arm's length rhetoric. This is the elephant in the room that has
unfortunately fallen into the OECD's "blind spot." Here, the language of the
action items does show promise: it admits that there are "hard-to-value
intangibles," which means intangibles that the current arm's length-based
transfer pricing regime is unable to regulate. Moreover, the action plan
accepts the possibility of adopting measures "beyond" arm's length to
measure intangibles, among others. 13 ' It clearly refuses to accept
consideration of a replacement for the arm's length-based system, yet the
above openness must signal a step in the right direction. To complete this
picture, the intangibles project already seems to have leaned towards
accepting a more central role for a profit split methodology that is already
formulary to a large extent, and there is a serious consideration of safe
harbors to further simplify the rules and increase legal certainty.132 This is
clearly consistent with the third principle of BEPS, yet of course the question
is how far the OECD will go. Most importantly, a clarification that arm's
length is the means rather than the end of the transfer pricing rules-either
explicitly or indirectly through the adoption of measures "beyond" arm's
length-should immensely contribute to a regime that has suffered from
confusion due primarily to the incoherence of its principles. 33
130. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 8, at 20.
131. Id. Action 7, at 20.
132. See, e.g., Isabel Verlinden & Vivienne Junzhao Ong, News Analysis:
The OECD Project on Intangibles-Reflections on the Public Consultation, 2012

WTD 227-3 (Nov. 26, 2012) (reporting comments of the business community to the
OECD intangibles work and stating: "The business community believes the
intangibles draft has a bias toward the application of the profit-split methods.").
133. A great example for this confusion is the United States Xilinx saga. See
Brauner, Cost Sharing, supra note 77, at 561-63 (describing the case, including the
extraordinary vacation of the decision in the first appeal and its eventual reversal all
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Related-and equally important-it seems that the OECD is clearly
promoting the principle of ensuring that the transfer-pricing outcome be "in
line with value creation." This principle is rudimentary, yet one can work
with it. This principle may not be easy to implement because it is apparently
inconsistent with some other language and current rules. Yet, it is clear and it
should be widely perceived as fair, and thus legitimate. If this principle
achieves legitimacy and acceptance, the work on implementation may have a
chance of success, regardless of the means. It is further consistent with the
second principle of BEPS and the holistic approach because such an
approach must be based on a sensible principle rather than on constant ad
hoc putting out of fires. The OECD must now clarify this principle and hope
for acceptance.
This, however, may prove difficult. For example, when an intangible
is completely designed and perfected in one country but is solely exploited in
a second country, where is value created-in the first or second? And if it is
created, how should the two jurisdictions split the value creation? Obviously,
straightforward arm's length is helpless when this is done within a single
firm, and the same problems that exist today are repeated. Yet the principle
may be useful to get rid of some issues, such as the question of whether the
workforce in place is relevant for transfer pricing study.13 4
Finally, the first principle of BEPS should also be satisfied in the
work on intangibles. It is the implementation of the rules, even if revised,
that would be key to their success. It simply has no chance of success
without enhanced collaboration in assessment and enforcement. Take, for
example, the so-called hard-to-measure intangibles-clearly the most
important challenge faced. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that partial
reform is possible and useful, even if it means that formulary elements are
only allowed for these intangibles-which seems to be the minimal position
of the action plan.'35 The risk is that if enhanced coordination is not included
in the reform, it would be bent and refitted into the arm's length world, much
in the same way that profit split and other nontraditional arm's length
methods were. Formulary solutions more visibly mandate coordination of

in the name of arm's length as the end, rather than the means, of the transfer pricing
rules).
134. The OECD is currently reluctant to accept this, yet it clearly creates
value.
135. Such partial reform is not impossible, as demonstrated by Reuven AviYonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment: Myths and ProspectsPromoting Better International Tax Policy and Utilizing the Misunderstood and
Under-Theorized FormularyAlternative (U. of Mich. L. & Econ., Empirical Legal

Studies Center Paper No. 10-029, U. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 221)
(2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693105.
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assessmentl 36 because the same formula must symmetrically apply to both
sides of the transaction. This, too, is in the spirit of the BEPS project and its
first principle.
Reform would be beneficial to the OECD beyond the BEPS project,
although that truly depends on political will. It would bring closer some of
the BRICS countries whose complaints about the OECD transfer pricing
practices topped their list of grievances. Inclusiveness is also necessary under
the BEPS principles, especially if one recognizes it as having a scope beyond
the OECD.
There are two technical points that require attention as well, although
a comprehensive technical analysis is beyond the scope of this Article and
should await a detailed proposal. First, the OECD-similarly to the current
rules-lumps all intangibles together despite some very significant
differences between them. Some of these differences result in different
patterns of value creation. Consistent with the value creation centrality
principle, it is expected that the deliverables would distinguish the different
intangibles according to their unique relevant features, and not,.for example,
dismiss the consideration of workforce in place (as already discussed above)
just because it is difficult to fit it into the simple intangibles paradigm and
measurement methods.13 7 Second, the mention of cost contribution
arrangements ("CCA") by the action plan is particularly puzzling, although
little discussion has been devoted to it. CCAs under the TPG are not akin to
American cost sharing. The OECD should be extremely cautious not to fall
into the trap of adopting rules similar to that of the United States. It is these
rules primarily-as stressed above-that generated the most offensive
transactions that led to the BEPS project.13 8
The next action item introduces two specific intangible elements that
are difficult to use within the current paradigm. This is action item nine
("Risks and Capital"):
Develop rules to prevent BEPS by transferring risks
among, or allocating excessive capital to, group members.
This will involve adopting transfer pricing rules or special
measures to ensure that inappropriate returns will not accrue
to an entity solely because it has contractually assumed risks
or has provided capital. The rules to be developed will also
require alignment of returns with value creation. This work
136. This assessment is intellectually required also in the arm's lengthbased regime, yet it is ignored, except for the very weak application of Article 9 in
tax treaties.
137. A formula could, of course, take the location of important workforce
into account when appropriate.
138. See also Brauner,Cost Sharing, supra note 77.

What the BEPS?

2014]

101

will be co-ordinated with the work on interest expense
deductions and other financial payments. 3 9
Capital is another Achilles heel of arm's length taxation because it is
obvious that the circumstances of MNEs are fundamentally different from
those of unrelated corporations, even when these corporations would engage
in similar transactions. Related parties operate as a single economic unit,
effectively capitalized as such, while unrelated companies obviously are
separately and independently capitalized. The work on Article 7 has exposed
this difficulty and there the OECD simply punted. It is difficult to see how
the OECD could achieve progress here within the framework of literal arm's
length.
Risk presents a trickier-yet not less difficult case-because it is a
matter of legal creation completely controlled by the taxpayers, supposedly
regardless of value creation. Yet, at the same time, one cannot ignore the
contribution of risk taking to value creation. So long as the OECD adheres to
this normative principle, it would have to take risk into account. The only
way to align the principle with the rules would be to use proxies to risk
taking, which again requires rethinking current methods and perhaps
accepting innovations. That would be consistent with the first and third
principles of BEPS.
Action item 10 takes the above action items a step forward by
explicitly acknowledging that certain related party transactions can never
take place on the market between unrelated parties, and thus do not
conveniently fit the arm's length paradigm. Action item 10 ("Other HighRisk Transactions") reads:
Develop rules to prevent BEPS by engaging in
transactions which would not, or would only very rarely,
occur between third parties. This will involve adopting
transfer pricing rules or special measures to: (i) clarify the
circumstances in which transactions can be recharacterised;
(ii) clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in
particular profit splits, in the context of global value chains;
and (iii) provide protection against common types of base
eroding payments, such as management fees and head office

expenses.140

139. OECD, ACTION
note 10, Action 9, at 20.
140. OECD, ACTION
note 10, Action 10, at 20.
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This action item largely follows and reinforces the conclusions of the
above action items. It also demonstrates the struggle within the OECD on
this matter. On one hand, this is essentially covered by action item eight, yet
the OECD chose to separately emphasize the situations where literal arm's
length does not make sense because there are no market comparables and
none can occur. In that sense, nothing new is expected to come from this
action item; although it does mention specifically profit split, it is mentioned
as an honorable defeat solution to save face for the arm's length apologists.
The action item mentions, however, two additional matters that may
be important. The purpose of the mention of recharacterization for transfer
pricing purposes here is unclear. If this means encouragement of the use of
legal constructs-such as analogy, etc.-to mold non-market transactions
into the shape of market transactions solely for the purpose of applying
traditional arm's length methods to them, then this comment raises concern.
It is exactly this approach that has failed to date and requires reevaluation.
Constant promises that "this time we will get it right" should not be
accepted.
The third comment is much more focused and mentions specifically
the base erosion payments that have caused BEPS and are viewed as
problematic and inappropriately dealt with under the current regime. These
payments involve primarily the relationship between the brain and mind of
the firm and the rest of it. Their serious evaluation requires a better
understanding of intangibles and related services and their fit in the current
legal scheme that, for instance, heavily relies on ownership.14 1 The problem
that the OECD faces is not conceptually different or separate from the
general policymaking for intangibles. Yet in this particular case there is an
alternative course of action, even if it is temporary-which in fact may be
necessary due to the tight timeline. That alternative is to ad hoc address
particular items of income such as those mentioned. The political attention
may allow the OECD to introduce technical fixes that would otherwise be
difficult to pass. Of course, it would be desirable that such fixes take into
account the larger picture and goals, and do not simply serve as another layer
of obstruction to fortifying the hold of arm's length thinking on the
international tax regime. Management fees, for example, never should be
viewed as simple provision of services, which is often camouflaged with
simple and minimal cost-plus margins. A true value-creation approach would
acknowledge the contribution of management as the heart and mind of the
firm. At the least, significant profit margin should be allocated to it, based on
the value-creation logic and the relative immobility of the humans that

141. This is rather ill-fitting to describe the economic function of
intangibles in general due to their cheap scalability and significant uncertainty and
unpredictability. See, e.g., Brauner, Value, supra note 5.
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comprise such management. Whether one wishes to use profit-split rhetoric
or a formula is a separate question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
Finally, the legal design of transfer pricing rules within the general
structure of the international tax regime is awkward and undisciplined. An
analysis of the reasons and history for this is a matter for separate study.
Regardless, although it is almost generally accepted that tax treaties
encompass commitment to arm's length-based transfer pricing-the details
of which are a matter for domestic law-an essential consensus expects them
to be compatible with the TPG. The actual treaty device is merely
complimentary to this construction. Article 9 requires a loose obligation to
respect a treaty partner's transfer pricing determinations. The levels of
commitment here vary, yet they vary between loose and extremely weak. A
principles approach that seems to be preferable-at least by a section of the
OECD experts working on these issues-would require a significant revision
of the architecture of the relevant rules, regardless of the content of the
principle chosen.
2.

Action Item 13
Documentation")142

("Re-examine

Transfer

Pricing

The high stakes debate within the OECD about the reform of the
transfer pricing rules is not less heated when it turns to the reporting facet of
transfer prices. The language of the action item is quite mellow in tone:
Develop
rules
regarding
transfer
pricing
documentation
to enhance transparency
for tax
administration, taking into consideration the compliance
costs for business. The rules to be developed will include a
requirement that MNE's provide all relevant governments
with needed information on their global allocation of the
income, economic activity and taxes paid among countries
according to a common template. 143
Most of the language states the obvious and is much in line with the
traditional approach to transfer pricing that gained some universality, even
beyond the OECD. It encourages better contemporaneous documentation of
the analysis that establishes the transfer pricing positions of taxpayers, and it
142. Located in the administrative part of OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE
10, (action items 10-15) that this Article
generally discusses in the next section, this action item focuses on information and
reporting. Yet, it is discussed here as it is naturally complementary to the discussion
of the substantive transfer-pricing rules.
143. Id. Action 13, at 23.
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note
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calls for a balance between the more general belief of the OECD orthodoxy
in the maximization of information exchange as a cure-all for international
tax challenges and the compliance cost of such information provision.
Despite the utilitarian flavor of the language, the general rule is in fact to
demand, report, and exchange all information that is clearly useful in tax
audits, but not usually more than that. Simply perfecting the current failing
paradigm would clearly be inconsistent with the BEPS project principles.
Two important innovations that may not be obvious from the
language of the action plan-or the original BEPS report-but have been
well-known as the expected key deliverables of action item 13 in the tax
community are (1) the standardization of a core of transfer pricing-related
information reporting and (2) the mandate of country-by-country reporting of
MNE operations. These two deliverables were explicitly specified as such by
a recent discussion draft released in this context.'"
The discussion draft includes a recommendation to standardize a
core transfer-pricing report that it calls the "master file," together with a
"local file." 45 The master file will include all the obviously needed
information about the overall structure and operations of the MNE, its
intangibles and its financial and tax positions, and will be available to all of
the countries where the MNE operates and which may have a tax claim over
such MNE's income. The local file will include information about the
relevant local entity or entities of the INE, information about local
transactions, and relevant financial information. This file will be available in
a standard format, yet with localized information only, in each relevant
jurisdiction. Then, each country may presumably be able to require
additional reporting beyond the standard to complement the local file.
This is a very promising action by the OECD. It directly deals with
the problem of divergence of transfer pricing reporting requirements in
different countries that obscured the true tax positions of taxpayers and
resulted in significant and unnecessary compliance costs to them. The
standardization permits an honest collaborative effort by tax authorities to
apportion tax jurisdictions among them based on an agreed-upon baseline
rather than the competition that generates inefficient incentives for both
taxpayers and tax authorities to obscure information. Further, standardization
is amenable to inclusiveness; it is especially helpful for governments that are
weak in comparison to MNE taxpayers and therefore may not alone be able
to demand and enforce compliance at a sufficient level. Finally,
standardization of this kind inherently enhances transparency and an honest
144. OECD,
AND

CBC

REPORTING

DISCUSSION DRAFT ON TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION
(2014) [hereinafter OECD, DISCUssioN DRAFT] (released by

the OECD's WP6 that is working on action item 13 with a request for public
comments on the draft).
145. See templates in id. at 11-14.
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and educated discussion of the information as it is, it being available to all
countries. Such transparency is a condition to a fairer regime and a more
efficient one, being consistent with its core principles, such as the single tax
principle. It is also consistent with all three principles of BEPS: it is
innovative, it is comprehensive, and it enhances collaboration rather than tax
competition. Of course, it is likely that some taxpayers-especially the
largest M7NEs that are at the spotlight of BEPS-together with their home
countries would wage war against this deliverable as they feel that they are
winning the tax competition game.146 Resisting such opposition would be a
major test for the BEPS project.
The discussion draft also includes a recommendation to adopt
country-by-country reporting, although it leaves open, and calls for public
comments on, the desirable format-as part of the standard reporting
mentioned above or in a separate document, for example-for such
reporting.14 7 Nonetheless, it adds a model template for country-by-country
reporting as a separate file. 148
This is a major achievement of the BEPS project. This Article is of
the opinion that country-by-country reporting should be within the scope of
action item 11 that discusses transparency more generally, because although
much of the BEPS planning targeted is intertwined with transfer pricing
planning, it includes other elements that could equally benefit from such
reporting. Yet, for simplicity, the Article follows the action plan's order. If
implemented, country-by-country reporting may be the single most important
achievement of the so-called civil society involvement with international tax
policy shaping. 149 The role of civil society-the public-has been neglected
in the project itself and in the literature analyzing it, despite its crucial role in
raising the awareness to BEPS. Country-by-country reporting is important
not only for the substantive reasons of improving compliance and
enforcement, but also for the important legitimacy benefits it brings with it.
Restoring the confidence of the public in the international tax regime must be
a key goal of the BEPS project, thus the importance of legitimacy. It is also
consistent with the fundamental BEPS principles, being innovative,

146. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, OECD BEPS Country-by-Country Reporting
Is Too Burdensome, HMRC Official Says, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 28-3 (Feb. 11,

2014) (quoting opposition expressed by a U.K. official to the discussion draft,
claiming that it goes too far and requires reporting of information that is not
obviously necessary for effective tax audits, which is very much in line with the
traditional OECD competition-based approach as it is explained above).
147. OECD, DIscussioN DRAFT, supra note 144, at 5-6.
148. Id. at 15-16.
149. See, for example, the relevant webpage on the Tax Justice Network
website: http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/country-by-country/
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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amenable to a collaborative approach, and helpful for a holistic and coherent
reform with the inclusiveness and legitimacy it brings.
Yet to ensure these qualities, country-by-country reporting must also
be publicly available. The action plan and the discussion draft are vague
about it, yet there is overall resistance among both taxpayers and
governments to public exposure of these reports. Transparency is therefore
the most fragile element of the country-by-country reporting initiative. This
Article argues that country-by-country reporting must be publicly available.
Otherwise, it is almost certain to become ineffective as an enforcement
mechanism and irrelevant for the important-yet often ignored-legitimacy
purposes. Tax authorities are likely to argue that tax information should be
kept confidential because otherwise desirable competition would be hindered
and there would be incentive for taxpayers to cheat on their tax returns. The
most popular argument in this regard is that detailed information may expose
all of the key intangible information that makes MANEs what they are.
Interestingly, the discussion draft does not resort to such slogans and calls
solely to ensure "that there is no public disclosure of trade secrets [and]
scientific secrets."150 Yet it adds to this list for good measure the nondescript
"or other confidential information."' 5 ' The Article calls for the OECD to
either eliminate this latter safety valve or explicitly assert that it is meant for
very specific cases where the law otherwise substantively protects the
confidentiality of the relevant information. A review of the country-bycountry reporting template released by the discussion draft demonstrates that
the aggregate-natured information mentioned on it could not affect the
competitive position of taxpayers beyond its effect on the aggressiveness of
their tax planning. In addition, tax authorities may make the even worseand somewhat contradictory-claim that country-by-country reporting is
altogether unnecessary because the tax authorities in the different countries
already either have the rather minimal information it provides or have the
means to obtain that information. This is necessarily untrue because with the
information, BEPS would not be such a big problem. Even worse, if it is
true, then governments have the information but have not acted on it. Of
course, this argument completely ignores the public implications of
transparent country-by-country reporting that would open it to public, media,
and academic scrutiny.
Finally, country-by-country reporting may assist in the development
of multilateral instruments. These instruments are currently handicapped by
the partial information available, primarily due to the bilateral nature of the
current international tax regime.

150. OECD, DiscussION DRAFT, supra note 144, at 9.
15 1.Id.
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Administrative and Compliance

Five primarily administrative action items support the substantive
portion of the action plan-action items one through 10. They are about
reporting, dispute resolution, and development of a multilateral treaty
mechanism. Except for the latter, these are generally items that are already
central to current tax treaty law. The key innovation of BEPS is the explicit
inclusion of an action item on a multilateral instrument. The mere
consideration of such a measure is almost revolutionary to the dominantly
bilateral international tax regimes. This section discusses the less innovative
elements of this part of the action plan, excluding action item 13 regarding
transfer pricing documentation, which that is discussed with the other
transfer pricing elements above-leaving action item 15 ("Develop a
Multilateral Instrument") to be separately discussed in the next section.
1.

Action Item 11 ("Establish Methodologies to Collect and
Analyze Data on BEPS and the Actions to Address It")

This action item generally calls for transparency-which is a favorite
among all-yet, interestingly, it also calls for ex-post analysis that promotes
accountability, which is often disliked by political institutions. However,
there is little "action," in this action item, as it calls for the OECD to:
Develop recommendations regarding indicators of
the scale and economic impact of BEPS and ensure that
tools are available to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness
and economic impact of the actions taken to address BEPS
on an ongoing basis. This will involve developing an
economic analysis of the scale and impact of BEPS
(including spillover effects across countries) and actions to
address it. The work will also involve assessing a range of
existing data sources, identifying new types of data that
should be collected, and developing methodologies based on
both aggregate (e.g. FDI and balance of payments data) and
micro-level data (e.g. from financial statements and tax
returns), taking into consideration the need to respect
taxpayer confidentiality and the administrative costs for tax
administrations and businesses.1 52
The OECD has traditionally pursued exchange of information as a
panacea and the sole appropriate action for fighting tax evasion. The work on
152. OECD, ACTION
note 10, Action 11, at 21.

PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra

Florida Tax Review

108

[Vol. 16:2

information exchange has been delegated to the global forum"s3 and should
probably affect the BEPS project only marginally. The specific call for the
development of a research and accountability mechanism is praiseworthy and
may be very important for the success of the BEPS project. The OECD made
the effort to give concrete examples for data to be collected, and although it
mentions the need to balance administrative costs and privacy issues, it does
not refer to the latter as exceptions but rather as balancing factors. This may
mean that the OECD is serious about installing this accountability
mechanism. Accountability is a critical factor in the success of reforms in
any field.154 It may signal a serious commitment to reform on the part of the
OECD. It is innovative and legitimacy promoting, so, as such, it is consistent
with a more collaborative approach to reform and with the fundamental
principles of BEPS.
2.

Action Item 12 ("Require Taxpayers to Disclose Their
Aggressive Tax PlanningArrangements")

Action item 12 is another transparency-promoting action item.
Similar to action item 11, it is not truly an action item, but rather calls for a
study and a report on the improvement of information collection. Yet action
item 12 focuses on taxpayers, with the view to balance some of the
information asymmetry between governments and taxpayers by requiring
taxpayers to concede of some of this advantage they have. It calls for the
OECD to:
Develop recommendations regarding the design of
mandatory disclosure rules for aggressive or abusive
transactions, arrangements, or structures, taking into
consideration the administrative costs for tax administrations
and businesses and drawing on experiences of the increasing
number of countries that have such rules. The work will use
a modular design allowing for maximum consistency but
allowing for country specific needs and risks. One focus will
be international tax schemes, where the work will explore
using a wide definition of "tax benefit" in order to capture
such transactions. The work will be co-ordinated with the
153. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
154. For an interesting discussion of the importance of accountability in
international reforms, see, for example, WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S
BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE So MUCH ILL
AND So LITTLE GOOD 15-17 (2006) (explaining, with ample examples throughout
the book, the importance of feedback and accountability mechanisms for the chance
of success of development reforms).
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work on co-operative compliance. It will also involve
designing and putting in place enhanced models of
information sharing for international tax schemes between
tax administrations.155
There is little background available about this action item, yet it
seems as if the United States' experiences influenced it.' 6 A comprehensive
study of the effectiveness of such measures and their design is beyond the
scope of this Article, particularly because this action item is not at the top of
the agenda of the OECD at this time. One should however note that the
United States' experiences with the reporting of tax shelter activities may not
be as positive as believed. Further, the context is different because it is
naturally simpler to identify reportable transactions pursuant to a specific and
single legal regime than pursuant to general principles. Diverse and sporadic
reporting may even exacerbate-rather than alleviate-BEPS, as it is likely
that different countries would employ different rules on these very sensitive
matters with differing commitments to, and success in, their enforcement.
Such unilateral action was the target of the BEPS project in the first place.
This risk may not be worthwhile, especially when the value of the reward is
questionable. Further study-so long as it has cooperation and the goal of a
multilateral arrangement in mind-may be useful.
3.

Action Item 14 ("Make Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
More Effective")

This dispute resolution action item calls for the OECD to "[d]evelop
solutions to address obstacles that prevent countries from solving treatyrelated disputes under MAP, including the absence of arbitration provisions
in most treaties and the fact that access to MAP and arbitration may be
denied in certain cases."'5 It is unclear what direction the OECD will take
on this matter. It is true that were treaty dispute resolution better, BEPS
would be negatively affected; yet it is difficult to see a significant direct
causal link between BEPS and the current state of treaty dispute resolution.
Nonetheless, it is important to have a dispute resolution action item because

155. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra
note 10, Action 12, at 22.
156. For the United States' rules, see, for example, Todd C. Simmens &
James G. Hartford, Reportable Transactions,648 TAx MGMT PORT. (BNA) (2013).
157. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra

note 10, Action 14, at 23.

FloridaTax Review

110

[Vol. 16:2

dispute resolution is the most obvious platform for international
collaboration on tax matters and this platform is already in place. 58
The current dispute resolution paradigm-based on the well-known
Mutual Agreement Procedure ("MAP")-is largely elective. The OECD has
promoted mandatory arbitration to be added to MAP, with little, or perhaps
slow, success to date.' 59 The collaborative element may cause some prior
options for reform of the MAP to resurface. One that comes to mind is the
proposal to establish an independent tax treaties interpretation board that
would free treaty interpretation from the rigid institutional constraints of the
OECD without harming the stability of the international tax regime.160 Such
a board could also assist, perhaps in a nonmandatory fashion, in the
resolution of difficult treaty disputes--especially when the implication may
go beyond the specific facts. Such a solution is just one example of progress
possible in consistency with the fundamental principles of BEPS.
E.

Action Item 15 ("Develop a MultilateralInstrument")

Standing alone as the single clearly innovative action item of the
BEPS project, action item 15 calls for the OECD to:
Analyse the tax and public international law issues
related to the development of a multilateral instrument to
enable jurisdictions that wish to do so to implement
measures developed in the course of the work on BEPS and
amend bilateral tax treaties. On the basis of this analysis,
interested Parties will develop a multilateral instrument
designed to provide an innovative approach to international
tax matters, reflecting the rapidly evolving nature of the
global economy and the need to adapt quickly to this
evolution.16'
Success with this action item should be interpreted to success of the
BEPS project regardless of the outcome of the other deliverables. A
reasonable design of the project would necessarily require completion of
158. Through tax treaty provisions, such as Article 25 of the 2010 OECD
Model Convention.
159. See, e.g., Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax
Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 703 (2009)

(providing a critical review of the OECD's push in favor of the inclusion of
mandatory arbitration provisions in tax treaties).
160. See Kees van Raad, International Coordination of Tax Treaty
Interpretationand Application, 29 INTERTAX 212 (2001).

161. OECD, ACTION
note 10, Action 14, at 23.
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action item 15 prior to the work on all other action items because it would
necessarily be inefficient to reform rules that may be incompatible with the
framework of the system in which they would operate. Nonetheless, this is
indeed necessary in light of BEPS's messy upbringing and the tight schedule.
The timeframe also dictated the goal of this action item, designed to produce
not a multilateral instrument but a report on how would one go about
designing such an instrument. Yet, this Article supports the OECD's decision
to proceed in this path rather than hasten the process and produce a
multilateral instrument that could not work. Nonetheless, the OECD has two
years to produce a report that will be readily and realistically implementable;
any other result should be viewed as a grave failure.
It is impossible to argue, consistently with the first principle of
BEPS, that a shift from a competition to a collaboration paradigm is
inevitable, yet stick to a bilateral framework. The next step should be to
design all other deliverables with a view of having a multilateral instrument
rather than in mere compatibility to the current bilateral regime. The OECD
should remember that tweaking bilateral arrangements for triangular cases,
for example, has proven either insufficient or unsatisfactory, hence the BEPS
project. Yet, as has been demonstrated throughout the above analysis, bad
habits (and conservatism) die hard.
It is absolutely crucial that the group discussing action item 15
understands that multilateral arrangements and convergence do not have to
be an all-or-nothing matter. The unique structure of the international tax
regime permits gradual progress. 16 2 Yet, progress requires focus. This Article
argues that such focus necessitates a forum for the discussion and assessment
of multilateral tax ideas. The OECD should make the decision whether it is
willing host such a forum as the most natural candidate for this job, despite
its rather more limited focus as the rich countries' club. This should be
desirable for such countries who suffer most from BEPS, and for the OECD
as an institution. Other options include perhaps a more "modular" model
rather than the OECD's rigid single format. The strength of the OECD model
is not in its strict singularity but in the standardization and the accessibility it
provided. These may be preserved, albeit in a different, more collaborative
and multilateral format, and it seems that the OECD has adequately started
the process toward such end.
IV.

CONCLUSION

BEPS is an overwhelming project in its breadth; it seems to be about
everything and nothing at the same time. It covers essentially the whole
international tax regime on one hand, yet on the other hand it may be read as
a narrow hole-gapping exercise directed at stopping the most aggressive tax
162. See Brauner, Crystallization,supra note 17.
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planning schemes-schemes that triggered the attention to BEPS in the first
place.'63 This Article argues that the OECD work and interim reports on
BEPS-as well as the unprecedented attention to it by the media, civil
society, and politicians-leave little doubt that a narrow reading of the BEPS
charge, if it is interpreted into limited deliverables and minor revisions of the
rules of the international tax regime, will signal a failure of the project.
Such failure will have grave implications: (I) it will further
destabilize the international tax regime; (II) it will further weaken the OECD
as the caretaker of the regime and the sole forum for international tax policy
discourse; (III) it may renew the distrust among the developed and
developing countries that are already engaged in collaborative projectsalbeit in the fringes of the regime, such as in the global forum initiative; (IV)
it may strengthen the disbelief in international policy cooperation with the
consequence of increasing unilateralism and tax competition of the harmful
kind that triggered the project in the first place;164 and (V) it will deepen the
distrust of the public in the fairness and legitimacy of the tax system. Thus
the stakes are truly high for all of the parties involved.
This is interesting because the BEPS project has very undisciplined
and opportunistic roots because it evolved through a political response to
media frenzy rather than an educated study of the international tax regime.
Nonetheless, the OECD and others have already studied the challenges
presented by the project quite extensively in the more general context of
international tax reform. The BEPS charge simply created the opportunity to
expeditiously engage in such a reform. However, the opportunity dictated
some limitations: the timeframe is very limited and the clientele is mixednot only OECD members, but also the G20, some of whose members view
themselves as leaders of additional developing countries. These limitations,
together with the history of the OECD work on the international tax regime
generated a puzzle over the exact goals of the BEPS project. Yet from the
beginning, three fundamental instrumental principles for tax reform surfaced:
(1) only collaboration among countries could succeed in tackling the BEPS
challenges; (2) a comprehensive and holistic rather than an ad hoc approach
to such challenges is required; and (3) there may be needed some
innovations, or the acceptance of solutions that are not part of the traditional
arsenal of tax policy measures.

163. This seems to be the position of the United States. See, e.g., supra
notes 49-50.
164. This does not mean that the competition paradigm will win the day and
policymakers will accordingly return to the perfection of such competition. The
more likely scenario is that the stronger economies will cooperate in smaller groups
at the inevitable expense of the weaker economies, global economic growth, and
fairness.
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These principles represent a laudable departure by the OECD from
its trenched position defending the orthodoxy and conservatism that
dominates the tax world. This Article studied the current work of the OECD
on BEPS, together with educated speculation about the likely outcome of the
first phase of the project. It then evaluated the compatibility of the work and
the likely deliverables with the principles set by it. The result is mixed-as
may have been expected.
The first principle of BEPS represents a major step forward for the
OECD. The competitiveness paradigm is entrenched in all of the norms of
the international tax regime and the regime lacks a mechanism to effectuate
collaboration. There isn't even a forum where these issues may be discussed
beyond the OECD, which has been reluctant to serve as the forum for
universal tax policy reform. Yet the OECD has realized that unilateral action
within a tax competition framework simply does not work, regardless of the
wisdom or best intentions of each country's separate actions. The most
important achievement of the BEPS project should be making progress
towards a multilateral instrument, following up on the work done pursuant to
action item 15. In the meantime, particular reforms should be designed with
the view of being subjected to such an instrument. For example, the likely
recommendations pursuant to action item two on the desirability of domestic
specific anti-abuse mechanisms necessarily fit a competition rather than a
collaboration paradigm, and thus are not compatible with a multilateral
setting. Similarly, the resort to "best practices" guidance pursuant to action
items three ("Strengthen CFC Rules") and four ("Limit Base Erosion via
Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments") is unlikely to fit a
multilateral framework. At the same time, the establishment of principles in a
manner new to the international tax regime shows significant promise. The
explicit articulation of the single tax principle-although it could have been
more forceful-is one example, and the principle that transfer pricing must
correspond with value creation is another. Both have a bumpy road ahead,
including some immediate political challenges and longer termed
implementation challenges-as explained above-yet they represent a
chance for the international tax regime to evolve and thrive in its new
projected collaborative framework. Similarly, the standardization of transfer
pricing documentation represents a similar approach on the procedural front,
with the benefit of not only the obvious standardization but also its
inclusiveness and transparency properties, which permits its application at
any scale in a true multilateral fashion.
The second principle of BEPS-promoting a holistic approach to
reform rather than ad hoc solutions to burning problems-is obviously
related to the first principle. The standard transfer-pricing reporting just
mentioned is one example of progress in this direction; the principled
approach promised for the substantive transfer pricing for intangibles rules is
another. Yet, there is still much to be desired in this context. The likely
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response to hybrid mismatch arrangements pursuant to action item two-and
similar ad hoc solutions proposed pursuant to action items three, four, and
five, all relying on domestic anti-abuse mechanisms that are at most going to
be guided by OECD best practices reports in the conservative fashion-is
disappointing from this perspective. These responses demonstrate the
difficulty of disposing of old habits, even as the response is made in the
context of a project such as BEPS-which was clearly launched to reform
them.
The third principle of BEPS is about innovation and openness to new
ideas. This has been the primary weakness of a defensive OECD to date. Yet
this aspect of the BEPS project provides the most promise. A key example of
this volte face is the willingness to accept that intangibles present new
challenges to the international tax regime and cannot be simply regulated by
analogy to the traditional tangible property-focused rules. The dramatic
acceptance of the need to go "beyond arm's length" will likely prove the
single most powerful action against BEPS. Other notable examples include
the mere willingness to consider a multilateral instrument rather than to
confine the regime to its currently struggling bilateral format, country-bycountry reporting, and safe harbor mechanisms in both the transfer pricing
and debt financing action items.
In conclusion, the BEPS project presents a mix of promise and
concern as it proceeds to reform the international tax regime. This Article
points to some of the positive courses and warns of some potential slippery
corners on the path. This Article's final contribution is to assess what are
realistically the most important aspects of this analysis, so that the OECD
can consider this Article's point of view while the window of opportunity for
such consideration is still open and the project is not finalized. First and
foremost, the project must produce "something" on action item 15 toward the
development of a multilateral instrument and compatibility of the legal
regime with the continuously globalizing marketplace. Second, transferpricing reform is the most immediate necessity because transfer-pricing
planning is the hallmark of BEPS. Institutionalizing the value creation
principle and pouring content to it through implementation rules will
represent success. This should be done following the recognition of the
unique characters of intangibles and the acceptance of new solutions-such
as formulary apportionment, the use of safe harbors, and standardization of
reporting. Third, some tangible deliverables should be produced in the
shorter term. Reform of the debt financing and business taxation rulesincluding PE rules-and response to hybrid planning should be first in line.
For the reform and response, the project should resist the temptation to resort
to unilateral solutions-such as domestic anti-abuse norms-and to soft
"best practices" guidance; rather the project should develop mechanisms
compatible with the future multilateral, collaborative regime. Finally, the
project should clearly recognize the fragility of the international tax regime
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and the necessity of restoring public trust and wider legitimacy. A public
country-by-country reporting scheme would be an excellent tool towards
achieving this goal. Similarly, widening the scope of reform to include the
interests of emerging and developing economies-for example, by
expanding the discussion of business taxation beyond the two anecdotal
issues mentioned in action item five-would send a clear signal about the
BEPS project's sincerity about making the regime more inclusive, fairer, and
truly multilateral.

